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J. INTRODUCTION
INCE the appearance of Professor Davis' book, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 a number of significant studies have
considered the problem of abuse of administrative discretion in the

S

• Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A 1963; J.D. 1966, Valparaiso
University.
This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the reqµirements for the degree
of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. The
author wishes to express his thanks to Professors Abraham D. Sofaer and Peter L.
Strauss of the Columbia University School of Law for their time and advice in the
preparation of this article.-Ed.
1. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMIN,ARY INQUIRY (1969).
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area of law enforcement.2 One aspect of administrative discretion
that warrants closer scrutiny is the power of an agency to impose
sanctions upon a regulated person found to have violated relevant
standards of conduct. The importance of this power should not be
underestimated. When carrying out the sanctioning function, agencies are acting not unlike criminal courts; accordingly, the sanctioning
process is replete with many of the problems of criminal sentencing,
including the difficult issue of treating similarly situated offenders
similarly. 3 Solutions to these problems will not develop by discussing
them in the abstract. Only after the particular processes are studied
to determine how sanctions are actually selected and imposed, and an
underlying body of data describing the sanctioning process is accumulated, will it be possible to consider realistic solutions to actual, as
opposed to suspected, sanctioning deficiencies.
The purpose here is to discuss the possibilities for administrative,
legislative, and judicial control of sanctioning discretion. Underlying
the discussion is the basic premise that, although discretion to select
sanctions may lead to arbitrary decisions, an alternative system that
entirely eliminated discretion would result in the mere illusion of
justice to the extent that mechanical rules deprived the agency of the
flexibility to assess the various relevant factors that determine the
appropriateness of a sanction in a particular case.4 A system that
2. See, e.g., Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the
Informal Agency Process, 1 J. l..EGAL Snmms 349 (1972). The Administrative
Conference of the United States has produced several studies on the exercise of
discretion in the administrative agencies. See generally 1, 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS OF THE .ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCB OF THE UNITED STATES (1968-1972)
[hereinafter REcoMMBNDATIONS AND REPORTS].
3. See, e.g., Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. RBv. 1 (1972).
4. This is not to disparage attempts to limit and control sanctioning discretion by
the formulation of guidelines that articulate factors to be considered in the selection
of an appropriate sanction. Indeed, one major purpose of this article is to propose
such guidelines. Further, social science research techniques may assist in eliminating
the need for discretion in the sanctioning process. For example, the United
States Board of Parole uses, as one part of its decision-making practice, a "salient
factor score," the purpose of which is to "predict the likelihood that an inmate will
succeed on parole." Project, Parole Release Deci$ionmaking and the Sentencing
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 824 (1975). The "salient factor score," however, does not
purport to predict with certainty whether an individual inmate will succeed or fail on
parole, but tends to "result in more 'correct' predictions in the aggregate • • ••" Id.
at 824 n.69. The Board's "Guidelines for Decision-making," while making use of
prediction techniques, do not eliminate discretion altogether. Id. at 825. Thus,
although statistical techniques may provide an important aid to improving sanctioning
practice, it seems likely that, given the state of the art, the exercise of discretion will
continue to be a necessary component of the process if we are to achieve a reasonable
degree of individualization. See generally Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform:
Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH, L. RBv. 1362,
1405-15 (1975). It seems appropriate to formulate a rule that at least directs the
decision-maker's attention to those relevant determinants of a sanction in any given
case.
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simplistically denies any exercise of administrative discretion in the
sanctioning process in effect denies a more complete definition of
justice. At the same time, however, a system iliat fails to provide
adequate guides and controls on the exercise of discretion tolerates
unwarranted departures from the ideal of a rule of law and not men.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is among those
federal agencies that possess discretionary power to impose sanctions
upon regulated persons; for example, the SEC regulates the activities
of broker-dealers registered with the Commission. 5 My study of the
SEC's practice in this area has been described in an earlier article. 6 In
general, that study concluded that certain factors describing the offense and offender tended .to correlate with the severity of the sanction imposed; in particular, the study revealed a pronounced disparity
in sanctions imposed on respondents affiliated with the New York
Stock Exchange {NYSE) as opposed to all others. Furthermore, the
study found that some factors that tended to correlate with sanction
severity appeared to be used inconsistently. 7
, This Article will consider some of the possibilities for controlling
and guiding the SEC's discretion to impose sanctions upon brokerdealers. Although it is limited to an examination of the Commission's practice and a discussion of possibilities for reform, the analysis
contains obvious implications for any agency with the power to
impose sanctions.8

II.

AN OVERVIEW OF BROKER-DEALER SANCTIONS
A.

Statutory Scheme

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires virtually all broker-dealers to register with the SEC prior to engaging in the business
of buying and selling securities for customers.9 The Commission is
empowered to impose sanctions upon both registered firms and persons associated with those firms. In the case of a registered firm, the
Commission has the authority to censure it, place limitations on its
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4) (Supp.
Aug. 1975).
6. Thomforde, Patterns of Disparity in SEC Administrative Sanctioning Practice,
42 TENN. L. REv. 465 (1975) [hereinafter SEC Case Study].
1. See text at notes 19-29 infra.
8. One example is a parole board, especially if such a board has power to
determine the duration of the indeterminate sentence. See Frankel, supra note 3, at
29-30.
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(a) (Supp. Aug.
1975). Although three narrow exemptions from registration are available, the nature
of those exemptions is such that practically all broker-dealers are registered. See B.
WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 10 (1965).
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activities, suspend it for a period not to exceed twelve months, or
revoke its registration. 10 In the case of an individual, the Commission can censure, place limitations on, suspend, or bar a person from
being associated with a broker-dealer.11 In addition, the Commission can suspend or expel a broker-dealer firm from membership in
any self-regulatory body registered with the Commission12 and suspend or bar a person from being associated with any such member. 13
Prior to imposing any or all of the above sanctions, the Commission must find both that the respondent has violated certain enumerated standards of conduct and that the imposition of the sanction is in
the public interest. 14 In particular, before imposing a sanction, the
Commission is required to make at least one of the following findings: (1) that the respondent willfully made a materially false or
misleading statement or omission in any report required to be filed
· with the Commission, including respondent's application for registration; (2) that the respondent has been convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor involving transactions in securities or like offenses;
(3) that ,the respondent is subject to an injunction prohibiting him
from engaging in the securities business or prohibiting unlawful
activity in connection with the business; (4) that the respondent
willfully violated any provision of the Exchange Act, the Securities
Act of 1933, the Investment Company Act of 1940, or the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, or any rule or regulation promulgated
under those acts; or (5) that the respondent willfully aided, abetted,
or procured the violation of the above mentioned acts, or failed
reasonably to supervise the business with a view to preventing violations of the securities laws. 15
Once it makes the requisite finding of misconduct, the Commission can exercise its discretion in imposing a sanction. 16 The only
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1S(b)(4), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4)
(Supp. Aug. 191S).
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1S(b)(6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(6)
(Supp. Aug. 1975).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(2), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78s(h)(2)
(Supp. Aug. 197S). Self-regulatory bodies include associations of brokers and dealers
registered under section lSA(b), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b) (Supp. Aug, 197S), clearing
agencies registered under section 17A(b)(1), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78q-1(b)(1) (Supp.
Aug. 1975), and securities exchanges registered under section 6(a), 1S U.S.C.A. §
78f(a) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(3), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78s(h)(3)
(Supp. Aug. 197S).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1S(b)(4), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4)
(Supp. Aug. 197S).
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 1S(b)(4)(A)-(B), 1S U.S.C.A. §~
78o(b)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. Aug. 197S).
16. For instance, the Commission may choose to revoke the registration pursuant
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express statutory limit on the Commission's exercise of discretion is
the requirement that the Commission find that the sanction is in the
public interest.17 Although the existence of the public interest standard implies that there are some limits to the SEC's exercise of
discretion, the broad range of possible interpretations of this standard18 creates the potential for inequities in the sanctioning process.
An analysis of the exercise of discretion by ,the SEC is ultimately an
analysis of how, in practice, the SEC has defined the public interest.

B. Summary of the Case Study ·of SEC Sanctioning Practice
The case study of SEC sanctioning practice analyzed 344 cases
involving broker-dealers and persons associated with broker-dealers
who were found by the Commission to have violated the securities
acts. 19 The study attempted to answer three related questions about
SEC sanctioning practice: first, which factors describing the offense
and the offender are utilized by the Commission in selecting sanctions; second, does the Commission's over-all use of these factors, or
combinations of factors, tend to correlate with sanction severity; and,
third, do the factors, or combinations of factors, appear to be utilized
in -a consistent manner-that is to say, do like
-tend to receive
like sanctions. 20
,
To answer these questions, each case was first analyzed with
reference to specific factors describing both the offender and the
offense involved. Factors describing an individual respondent characterized either his status or his attitude. Factors relating to the respondent's status included age, experience, prior ['ecord, and general
reputation and current status in the industry; those relating to the
respondent's attitude included intent, willingness to reform, willingness to make restitution, and willingness to consent to the imposition

cases

to section 15(b)(4), and expel the respondent from the National Association of
Securities Dealers pursuant to section 19(h) (2).
·
17. Section 19,(h) has an additional general requirement that action taken by the
Commission be "for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of'' the Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 19(h)(l), (2), (3), 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78s(h)(l), (2), (3) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
18. For instance, the SEC has occasionally found that the imposition of a
sanction for a willful violation is not required to protect the public interest. See, e.g.,
David G. Baird, 43 S.E.C. 815 (1968).
.
19. As used herein, "case" refers to each individual respondent, even though more
than one respondent may have been a patty to the same action.
20. As used herein, a "standard" is the criterion or rule; it measures and
announces the legal significance of a particular factor or combination of factors. A
. "factor'' is an element or characteristic of the offense or offender that may be referred
to or embodied in a standard,
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of a sanction. Factors describing the offense included not only the
particular statutory section or rule violated, but also the geographic
scope of the violation and the amount of money and the number of
investors involved.
It was possible, therefore, not only to determine which factors
appeared in the cases, and with what frequency, 21 but also to determine whether a correlation existed between certain factors and sanction severity. In general, the study indicated that the presence of
certain factors tended to affect the severity of the sanction imposed in
a manner that was both predictable and consistent with stated Commission policy. 22 Thus, although 37.8 per cent of all cases resulted
in expulsion, the expulsion rate increased if the offense involved fraud
(42.1 per cent) or an intentional violation of the law (53.2 per cent),
or if the respondent either had a prior record (66.7 per cent) or
contested the Commission's action (62.1 per cent). On the other
hand, the expulsion rate dropped in those cases in which the offense
did not involve fraud (21.1 per cent), or in which the respondent
offered to make restitution (20 per cent), had a good reputation
(17.9 per cent), consented to the imposition of a sanction (25.5 per
cent), or was willing to reform (3.7 per cent).23
Despite the obvious impact of certain factors, the study revealed
that no single factor was controlling. The lack of a controlling factor
is not particularly surprising given the variety of possible combinations in which factors (both mitigating and aggravating) may appear.
However, even when apparently similar cases were compared, not all
respondents received the same sanction. Further, the study revealed
that some factors were not always utilized by the Commission even
though they were discoverable and their relevance had been acknowledged by the SEC in other cases. For example, although the respondent's reputation in the industry was acknowledged as a relevant
consideration in over 12 per cent of the cases (the presence of a good
reputation correlating with a reduction in expulsion rate), the reputation of respondents in the other 88 per cent of the cases apparently
was not considered in selecting an appropriate sanction. 24 It is
possible of course that the Commission did consider reputation in all
cases, but simply failed to mention that it had been considered. It is
21. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 493 (Table R) (summarizing frequency
with which factors appeared).
22. For a discussion of SEC sanctioning policy to protect investors, deter viola•
tions, achieve voluntary compliance, and rehabilitate respondents, see text at notes 4678 infra.
23. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 493 (Table R), 476-97.
24. See id. at 490-91 (Table P), 493 (Table R).
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also possible, however, that the factor was overlooked or ignored in
some cases. 25 Thus, although the study showed that the presence of
certain factors tended to correlate with sanction severity, it also raised
the possibility that the factors utilized by the Commission in determining an appropriate sanction were not applied consistently.
Finally, the data revealed what appears to be a substantial disparity between the severity of sanctions imposed upon respondents affiliated with the NYSE and sanctions imposed upon all others. Table A
summarizes the analysis by comparing ·the rates of expulsion for
NYSE respondents with the rates for all other respondents in fraud
and nonfraud cases. 26
TABLE A
Comparison of Expulsion Rates for NYSE
Respondents and All Others

NYSE
Fraud
Rate of Ex13.5%(10of 74)
pulsion
Nonfraud
Rate of Expulsion
4%( 1 of 25)
Rate of
Censure
48%(12 of 25)

N.Y.
( other than
NYSE)

Non-N.Y.
(other than
NYSE)

24.5%(14 of 57)

64.2%(88 of 137)

28.6%( 4 of 14)

31.3%(10of 32)

28.5%( 4 of14)

12.5%( 4 of 32)

The disparity in sanction severity is most pronounced when the
rates of expulsion for NYSE and non-New York fraud are compared;27 however, the disparity also exists in the smaller category of
25. Although reputation was noted in only 12 per cent of the cases, it is obvious
that all respondents have some kind of reputation. This is not to suggest that
reputation will always be relevant. It is to say, however, that, when a discoverable
factor is not specifically considered, one possible conclusion is that it was overlooked
in some cases in which it might have been relevant.
26. These findings are discussed in detail in SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at
491-515.

27. Even the 13.5 per cent figure is misleadingly high. Only one firm, Pickard &
Co., had its registration revoked; the firm and its employees who were barred account
for over 40 per cent of all NYSE bars and revocations. See C. Eugene Osment, II,
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8658 (July 25, 1969); Joseph V. Shields, Jr., SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 8484 (Jan. 3, 1969), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SF.C. L. REP. ,r 77,643; Jack Flittman, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8449
(Nov. 4, 1968); John W. Bendall, Jr., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8448 (Nov.
14, 1968); Pickard & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8447 (Nov. 14, 1968);
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nonfraud. 28 In general, the study concluded that New Yorkers (particularly in fraud cases) tend to be less likely to be expelled than nonNew Yorkers, and NYSE respondents, regardless of their location, are
the least likely of all to be expelled in either fraud or nonfraud cases.
As described in more detail in the case study, this disparity was not
explained by taking into account more particular descriptions of the
offense and offender. 29
The case study of SEC practice thus presents two problems: first,
the possibility that in exercising its discretion to sanction offenders the
SEC is utilizing relevant factors in an inconsistent manner; and,
second, that SEC sanctioning practice has resulted in a disparity
between the treatment of NYSE and non-NYSE respondents. The
question, then, is whether these kinds of problems lend themselves to
correction by administrative, legislative, or judicial action.
ill.

CONTROL OF DISCRETION BY LEGISLATIVE OR
.ADMINISTRATIVE RULES

A.

The Necessity, Desirability, and Practicability of Rules To Limit
Discretion

The use of discretion30 in the sanctioning process is as essential as
the abuse of discretion is intolerable: Because rules cannot be formulated to deal with every combination of factors that may confront a
decision-maker, some discretion is necessary to make the punishment
fit the crime; at the same time, unlimited discretion may lead to a
situation in which sanctions are imposed without standards, without
certainty, and without an even hand. 31 To a great extent, the process
of administrative sanctioning (and the process of sentencing in general) has been allowed to proceed free from rules and standards that
would define the boundaries of the exercise of discretion. At the
outset, then, any attempt to formulate a rule purporting to limit
sanctioning discretion ought to consider three broad questions: Is
rule-making in this area (1) necessary, (2) desirable, or (3) practicable?32
John Sackville-Pickard, SEC Exchange Act Re]ease No. 8433 (Oct. 24, 1968), [19671969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 77,620.
28. Moreover, in nonfraud cases NYSE respondents had a significantly higher
frequency of censure. See Table A.
29. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 501-15.
30. "Discretion" is used herein as defined by Davis: "A public officer has
discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice
among possible courses of action or inaction." K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 4.
31. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 1-5.
32. These three questions are implicit in Professor Sofaer's "Framework for
Governing Discretion," described in Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 CoLUM, L. Rav. 1293, 1295-98 (1972).
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It has been suggested that the subject of administrative discretion
is deserving of judicial attention "only when :the [exercise of
discretion] may have serious consequences." 33 This generalization
provides an appropriate starting point for questioning the necessity of
rule-making in the area of sanctioning discretion. It would seem
obvious that the manner in which the SEC exercises its power to
choose an appropriate sanction has "serious consequences" for the
respondent since, among other things, the respondent may lose the
right to engage in the securities business. 34
Yet, even if the exercise of Commission discretion may have
serious consequences, the necessity for rule-making diminishes if the
discretion is already "effectively governed by standards, rules or other
guides that narrow discretion." 35 Although SEC sanctioning practice
is limited to some extent by existing standards, these standards only
minimally restrict the exercise of discretion. For example, the statutory "protection of investors" and "public interest" standards act as
general guidelines for the exercise of sanctioning discretion. However, these general guidelines will be of little help to regulated parties
in determining either what the law is or how it will be applied in a
particular case. Similarly, the SEC currently relies on certain factors
that describe the offense and offender in determining an appropriate
sanction, yet the case study shows that the Commission utilizes those
factors in an inconsistent manner. Thus, even if appropriate standards for the exercise of Commission discretion presently exist, rulemaking might contribute to a more effective utilization and application of those standards.
If there is a general necessity to provide more effective guidelines
for the sanctioning practice, one may still question the desirability of
attempting to limit discretion by rule-making. In particular, one may
ask whether rules that purport to provide standards to limit discretion
deprive administrators of the flexibility necessary to adapt to unanticipated circumstances or to achieve individualized justice.36 On one
level, of course, the question goes to the matter of draftsmanship. A
poorly drafted rule might not only deprive the adjudicator of flexibility, but might also "require" sanctions that would be as unjust as those
imposed under a system of standardless sanctioning. Beyond the
problem of adequate draftsmanship, the question focuses on the
33. Id. at 1296.
34. Not only expulsion, but suspension as well, may prove economica11y disastrous
for a sma11 firm. See SEC, REPORT OF nm .ADVISORY CoMMI'ITEE ON ENFORCEMENT
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 45 (1972) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITIEE REPORT].
35. Sofaer, supra note 32, at 1296.
36. Id. at 1296-97.
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tension between the goals of consistency and flexibility in law enforcement. To recognize this tension, however, is not to require a
choice between goals, for the principles of flexibility and consistency
are ultimately compatible.
It has been suggested that consistency is not a primary requirement of law enforcement and that, in the particular context of sanctioning, there is no legal necessity that similar cases be treated similarly. 37 If taken literally, however, such a position runs counter to the
principle of equal justice by the rule of law-a principle that is rooted
in the Constitution. Moreover, what may appear to be comparable
cases are often not comparable at all. For example, suppose
that two broker-dealers each sold securities by means of a misleading
prospectus. One, an experienced salesman with a prior record, may
have known that portions of the prospectus were false; the other, an
inexperienced person, may only have been negligent in not discovering the truth. Accordingly, if experience, state of mind, or prior
offenses are relevant considerations in qetermining an appropriate
sanction, the two cases are not "alike." Once genuinely similar cases
are identified, the principle of consistency becomes far more compelling.
The principle of flexibility becomes important in the identification
process. Flexibility is not a license to ignore relevant factors; rather,
it permits the adjudicator to take into account those factors that
determine like cases. Thus, a rule that articulates relevant factors to
guide sanctioning discretion does not necessarily interfere with the
proper role of flexibility. A rule that is designed to direct the
attention of the adjudicator to the generally relevant factors and to
permit the adjudicator to take into account factors peculiar to a
particular case furthers both the principle of consistency and the
principle of flexibility. 38
Another arguably undesirable effect of rules that guide discretion
is that known standards eliminate the potential deterrent effect of
uncertainty. Thus, for example, if a prosecutor's office is unable to
prosecute all known violations, the publication of the standards it
follows in selecting cases might result in encouraging violations by
37. See, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967); Martin A.
Fleishman, 43 S.E.C. 185, 190 (1966). Professor Nonnan Abrams, in an excellent
treatment of prosecutorial discretion, quotes Emerson's line: "A foolish consistency is
the hob-goblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and
divines." Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion,
19 UCLA L. REv. 1, 5 n.11 (1971). One may, however, note the distinction between
foolish and necessary consistency.
38. See generally Reiss, Research on Administrative Discretion and Justice, 23 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 69, 72-73 (1970).
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those not subject to prosecution under those standards. Yet, even if
under some circumstances reasons exist for not publicly disclosing
factors that guide prosecutorial discretion, 39 the situation is different
in the area of sanctioning discretion: The value of known standards
that control the sanctioning process would seem to outweigh the value
of any possible deterrent effect of uncertainty. After all, a rule that
articulates standards to limit sanctioning discretion would not necessarily require leniency or encourage violations; rather, the effect of a
properly drafted rule would be to ensure that reasonably equal sanctions were imposed upon similarly situated offenders.
Finally, if a rule limiting sanctioning discretion is both necessary
and desirable, one might still question the practicability of requiring
such a rule. Would the costs involved in formulating and applying
such a rule outweigh its benefits? 40 Naturally, costs in time and
manpower are incurred both in promulgating rules and in writing
decisions applying such rules to a given case. Whether these costs
are prohibitive, however, depends upon the existing practice of a
particular agency. The costs of formulating and applying a rule to
limit the sanctioning discretion of the SEC would be minimal: The
Commission has the statutory authority to formulate rules in accordance with the procedures required by the Administrative Procedure
Act. 41 The costs of administrative rule-making would seem to be
balanced by the prospective savings to the Commission and regulated
persons from the existence of articulated guidelines to delimit sanctioning practice. Because of the Commission's expertise in this area,
SEC rule-making would also appear to be more efficient than appealing to either the courts or Congress. Perhaps more importantly, the
Commission already writes opinions purporting to give reasons for
imposing its sanctions; thus, a rule requiring the Commission to
demonstrate that it has considered certain relevant factors would
impose little additional burden upon existing adjudicative procedures.
A rule aimed at controlling the exercise of discretion in this relatively
formal sanctioning process would be intended to direct adjudicative
efforts more profitably for the benefit of both the Commission and
the regulated party.
The practicability of requiring a rule to limit sanctioning discretion must ultimately turn upon our ability to draft a rule that will
offer meaningful guidance to the adjudicator. In an analogous
39. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 37, at 28-34; Sofaer, supra note 29, at 1297.
40. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 32, at 1296, 1298.
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970). The
rule-making requirements of the APA are found at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
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context, Justice Harlan described the possibility of articulating meaningful standards to guide a jury in sentencing as "beyond present
human ability." 42 Whether or not such pessimism is v,arranted,
however, depends upon what one attempts to achieve in a rule aimed
at guiding the exercise of human judgment. One could, for example,
promulgate a rule that declared that any sale of securities by fraud
-would result in expulsion; such a rule would be easy to apply but
would offend our felt need for individualized justice. On the other
hand, one might endeavor to formulate a rule that defined every
possible combination of factors in terms of a precise equation in an
attempt to produce absolutely equal sanctions; however, here one
must agree with Justice Harlan-such an attempt would be "beyond
present human ability." Yet neither of these extremes is necessary.
The Commission's own practice demonstrates that it is possible to
articulate certain relevant factors that ought to affect sanction severity. The object of formulating a rule to require the Commission to
utilize these factors more consistently in the sanctioning process
would be to codify the best of SEC practice in order to bring about a
more uniform application of existing standards.
Obviously, doubts about the practicability of formulating a meaningful rule that will accommodate the principles of flexibility and
consistency4 3 will not be resolved by mere generalizations. The discussion, therefore, must focus on the essential elements of a rule and
culminate in a proposed rule applicable to SEC practice.
B.

The Elements of a Rule

The only explicit statutory standard that limits the SEC's sanctioning discretion is the requirement that any sanction imposed by the
Commission be in the public interest. 44 This standard does not
adequately guard against the abuse of discretion, nor does it effectively guide the exercise of discretion. A workable rule must provide
both specific guidelines that are consistent with and supportive of the
purposes of the legislation being enforced, and procedures designed
to ensure that the substantive statutory provisions are followed. Thus,
the first step in formulating a rule to guide SEC sanctioning discretion
is to determine the purposes to be served by imposing a sanction upon
a regulated party; indeed, our perception of the proper purposes of
42. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971). See also In re Sierant,
24 N.Y.2d 675, 682,249 N.E.2d 455, 458, 301 N.Y.S.2d 604, 610 (1969).
43. Professor Davis refers to this balance as "[t]he optimum breadth for discretionary power." K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 52 (emphasis omitted).
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4)
(Supp. Aug. 1975). But see note 17 supra.
.
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SEC sanctions will affect the necessity, severity, or validity of imposing a sanction in any given case. 45 Once the proper sanctioning
purposes are discovered, the relevant factors that any rule serving
these purposes must articulate can be identified, and the procedural
requirements of such a rule can be developed.

1.

The Purpose of SEC Sanctions

The purpose of SEC sanctions has been described as remedial
rather than punitive; thus, it has been said that sanctions are intended
to protect investors rather than to punish offenders. 46 We should,
however, question whether the matter can be disposed of simply by
attaching the remedial-punitive labels.47 Is this distinction either
meaningful or desirable? In particular, to what extent, if any, should
this distinction influence the nature of a rule designed to control
sanctioning discretion?
The Commission and the courts purport to be guided by the
remedial-punitive distinction, as a recent Sixth Circuit case demonstrates. In Beck v. SEC, 48 the petitioner, a securities salesman, had
been suspended by the Commission for four months for willfully
violating the Securities Act by selling securities through the use of
false and misleading statements. 49 Recognizing the remedial-punitive distinction, the Commission stated: "The sanctions authorized by
Section 15 of the Exchange Act are part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme -to protect the public interest . . . . We have been cognizant of the importance of exercising the discretionary power reposed
in us in this area in a manner that will afford investor protection
without visiting upon the wrongdoers adverse consequences not required in achieving statutory objectives."5° Finding "that the probability of similar future occurrences is such that a temporary exclusion
from the securities business is required," 51 the Commission con45. Judge Frankel suggests that one of the "first principles" in an attempt to
reform sentencing practice should be "a statement of the substantive aims of sentencing ..••" Frankel, supra note 3, at 41. His second recommended principle is
"some fundamental procedural directives ••.•" Id. See text at notes 99-101 infra.
46. See E. WEISS, supra note 9, at 203.
47. There are, to be sure, other possible sanction purposes, including rehabilitation, voluntary compliance, and deterrence. 'See text at notes 72-78 infra.
48. 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970). The case had been before the court once
before. 413 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1969). At that time, the Sixth Circuit remandec;l the
case to the Commission for a more specific statement of the reasons for suspending
Beck, adding thai, without an adequate statement of reasons, it could not "determine
whether this sanction constitutes an abuse of discretion .•.." 413 F.2d at 834.
49•.Commonwealth Sec. Corp., 44 S.E.C. 100, at 100 (1969).
50. 44 S.E.C. at 101 (footnote omitted).
51. 44 S.E.C. at 102.
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eluded that the sanction "was necessary and appropriate for the remedial purposes contemplated under the federal securities laws.'' 112
In an attempt to convince the Commission that the sanction was unnecessary, Beck pointed out that the 1961 violation occurred when he
was inexperienced and inadequately trained. Subsequently, Beck
continued, he had "received appropriate training from a securities
firm which [had] employed him since August 1962," and, since that
time and July 1968 when the Commission suspended him, "there
[had] been no complaints concerning his conduct . . . ." 53 The
Commission, while agreeing that these factors were "favorable" and
noting that they were considered in imposing suspension, held that
"they do not assure -that Beck will observe ithe required standard of
conduct in the future . . . ." 54 Accordingly, the SEC found that a
four month suspension was necessary "to adequately ,[impress] upon
[Beck] . . . ·the necessity of avoiding a repetition of his specific misconduct. . . ."55 The court of appeals, however, disagreed. Noting
that "-the record discloses no reason to believe that [Beck] is inclined
to commit any further illegal or fraudulent acts," 116 the court concluded "that the Commission's order is punitive, not remedial" and
that "the relationship between the remedy adopted and the stated
reasons . . . is so tenuous .that we deem the order a gross abuse
of the Commission's remedial authority." 57
Beck is important not only because it demonstrates commitment
to the principle that SEC sanctions should have a remedial purpose,
but also because it demonstrates that the characterization of a particular sanction as "punitive" rather than "remedial" may have an important effect on the validity of the Commission's action. 58 Is one to
conclude, therefore, that whenever a sanction can be characterized as
punitive, its imposition is an abuse of discretion? It is arguable that
the sanctions available to the SEC--censure, suspension, and expulsion-always have a punitive effect, particularly from the point of
view of the offender. Beck itself demonstrates how vague the distinc52.
53.
54.
55.

44 S.E.C. at 103.
44 S.E.C. at 100-01.
44 S.E.C. at 102.
44 S.E.C. at 102-03.
56. 430 F.2d at 674.
57. 430 F.2d at 675. The court also noted that the six-year delay in imposing tho
sanction was not Beck's fault. 430 F.2d at 674. Other persons involved in the same
scheme were criminally prosecuted during this time. See United States v. Armel, 384
F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968).
58. The case is also significant in that it represents a rare reversal of an SEC
sanction. See text at notes 169-71 infra. The courts have usually maintained a
hands-off attitude when reviewing SEC sanctions. See, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373
F.2d 107, 110 (1967); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8-9 (1965).
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tion between punitive and remedial sanctions can be. For example,
although the court in Beck held that SEC sanctions may not be
punitive, it agreed that sanctions may be used to deter the offender
from future offenses. 59 Yet, for what reason is an offender deterred,
if not to avoid future punishment? To say that an offender will be
deterred not to avoid punishment, but rather to avoid future remedial
action is to create a formal distinction without substance. 60 Thus, if
punitive effect alone invalidates a sanction, courts should feel hardpressed to sustain any SEC sanction. 61
Apparently, the punitive-remedial labels owe their continuing
vitality, at least in part, to the belief that empowering a nonjudicial
instrumentality with the authority to impose criminal (i.e., punitive)
sanctions may raise constitutional difficulties. 62 To be sure, administrative procedures are "incompatible with the accepted rules and
constitutional guarantees of power governing the trial of criminal
prosecutions." 83 The accepted technique used to avoid the constitutional problem has been to label administrative sanctions "remedial"
in order to be "free of the punitive criminal element." 64 Commentators65 have often noted Justice Frankfurter's apparent frustration with
the "dialectical subtleties" 66 of the distinction. His characterization
of the majority's use of the punitive-remedial rationale in United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess 67 is illustrative of the problem: "The
argument seems to run thus: Double jeopardy means attempting to
punish criminally twice; this is not an attempt to punish criminally
because it is a civil proceeding; it is a civil proceeding because . . .
it is a 'civil sanction' . . . and the sanction is 'civil' because it is
'remedial' and not 'punitive' in nature." 68 Justice Frankfurter went
on to suggest that "[p]unitive ends may be pursued in civil proceedings, and, conversely, the criminal process is frequently employed to
attain remedial rather than punitive ends." 69 Justice Black's majority
59. 430 F.2d at 674.
60. Although the court found it unnecessary to decide whether a sanction may
have as one of its purposes deterring others from violations, the Commission claimed
this was a proper remedial purpose. 430 F.2d at 675.
61. Reviewing courts usually simply declare that SEC sanctions are not punitive,
but rather remedial. See, e.g., Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940).
62. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938); K. DAVIS, 1
.ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 2.13 (1958); McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The
Administrative Process, 49 IowA L REv. 44i, 444-45 (1964).
63. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,403 (1938).
64. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
65. See, e.g., 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.13, at 135 n.12.
66. United States er rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (concurring).
67. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
68. 317 U.S. at 553 (concurring).
69. 317 U.S. at 554.
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opinion in Hess appears at least to have aoknowledged Justice Frankfurter's objection. Justice Black pointed out that" '{p]unishment, in
a certain and very limited sense, may be the result of [a remedial
statute] so far as the wrong-doer is concerned,' but this is not enough
to label it as a criminal statute." 70
It may be possible to give more substantive content to the remedial-punitive characterization if a distinction is drawn between the
primary purpose of a sanction and its possible effect; indeed, Justice
Black may have been alluding to this distinction when he noted in
Hess that the fact that the enforcement of a statute may result in
punishment, from the offender's standpoint, is not enough to make it
a criminal statute. For example, the Beck decision can be interpreted
as holding that the SEC's sanction was invalid not because of the
presence of a punitive effect, but because of the absence of a valid
remedial purpose. Since Beck committed no violation during the sixyear period following his infraction, he did not appear to need
suspension ".to adequately ,[impress] upon him . . . the necessity of
avoiding a repetition of his specific misconduct . . . ." 71 Thus, the
absence of factors showing that investors were in need of protection
from Beck led the court to conclude that there was no remedial
purpose served by suspension and that the sanction was, therefore,
primarily punitive. Presumably, if the sanction had been imposed
shortly after Beck's violation, the SEC might have been warranted in
at least suspending Beck on the ground that there was a possibility of
future violations. The primary purpose of a suspension under those
circumstances would have been to protect investors by deterring Beck
from future violations, even though suspension clearly would have
had a punitive effect from Beck's point of view. This is not to
suggest that the line between purpose and effect is always clear or
easy to draw. Beck offers some evidence, however, that the distinction can provide a workable basis of decision for both the Commission and reviewing courts.
Finally, there are other remedial purposes that may be served by
SEC sanctions, in addition to those illustrated by Beck. Although
rehabilitation has become a significant, if not the primary, goal of the
criminal sanction,72 it is probably a far less significant function of the
regulation of the securities market. By and large, regulatory offenders are not perceived to have social or psychological problems that
have led to their offenses; furthermore, the Commission simply lacks
70. 317 U.S. at 551, quoting Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 157 (1899).
71. Commonwealth Sec. Corp., 44 S.E.C. 100, 102-03 (1969).
72. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 29.
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the necessary resources (both in terms of manpower and in terms of
statutory authority) to undertake the kind of rehabilitation hoped for
in the criminal sector. On the other hand, a kind of rehabilitation of
offenders is attempted when the Commission (as part of its sanction)
conditions re-entry into the securities business on the respondent's
retraining and close supervision. 73 This appears to be a technique
that is becoming more favored with the Commission. 74
An SEC sanction may also serve the purpose of achieving voluntary compliance with the law. 75 The Commission's primary method
of achieving voluntary compliance is probably through interpretive
releases and statements of policy that inform regulated persons about
the law and how it will be enforced. 76 Public notice of the imposition of a sanction may also contribute to voluntary compliance by
serving as a deterrent to others. 77 Acknowledging the deterrent value
of a sanction reintroduces the question of the use of sanctions as a
form of punishment, for how else does a sanction deter, if not as a
threat of punishment to those who would do likewise? Again, however, the question is one of ascertaining the primary purpose of a
sanction, for here the purpose is not to punish, but to achieve general
compliance--a valid remedial purpose. 78
To summarize, it appears that an SEC administrative sanction
may serve several remedial purposes that are consistent with the
73. See, e.g., Roy V. Montgomecy, SEC Exchange Act Release No._ 8223 (Jan. 3,
1968).
74. This assertion is based on the author's review of all SEC administrative
decisions between Noveniber 1973 and October 31, 1974. See, e.g., Reynolds & Co.,
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10835 (May 31, 1974), [1973'-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,I79,811.
15. See ADVISORY CoMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 14.
76. Releases not only explain Commission interpretations of law and policy, but
also serve as warnings to the broker-dealer community. In the midst of the 1968
back-office "crunch," for instance, the Commission issued a release to the industry
warning its members that certain practices (e.g., accepting a customer's order when
unable to deliver the securities) would be construed as violations of the anti-fraud
provisions of the Exchange Act. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8363 (Aug. 7,
1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ii 77,583.
77. The Commission, at least, believes in the deterrent value of sanctions. See,
e.g., Commonwealth Sec. Corp., 44 S.E.C. 100, 101 (1969).
78. Professor Goldschmid suggests that it would be worthwhile to study the
deterrent value of administrative sanctions. See Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the
Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal
Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 2, at 896,
946.
The general deterrent value of a sanction raises a potential question of fairness to
a particular offender. If, for example, the facts of a case would not otherwise
warrant a severe sanction to deter a particular offender, would the Commission be
justified in making an "example" of him? The Commission could conceivably justify
any sanction by its deterrent effect on others. General deterrence should be a
secondacy reason for imposing a sanction; its use as the sole justification is questionable.
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purpose of the securities acts to protect investors and ensure fair
securities markets.79 A rule to guide sanctioning discretion should
require that the Commission support the imposition of a sanction in
light of the need to protect investors, deter violations, achieve voluntary compliance with the securities laws, or contribute to the rehabilitation of offenders. Naturally, the importance of any one purpose, or
combination of purposes, will depend on the particular case being
adjudicated. A requirement that purposes be articulated, however,
will tend to ensure (though it will not guarantee) that the SEC has, in
fact, selected a sanction appropriate for the individual offender as well
as one necessary to achieve the regulatory purposes of sanctioning.
Indeed, the Commission generally supports its sanctions with such
reasons, so the requirement should impose no new or onerous burden
on the staff. 80 By articulating the proper purposes served by SEC
sanctions, the rule would also provide a form of notice to respondents
that would enable them to offer "evidence" on their behalf relevant to
those purposes. 81 Further, such reasons, in light of the findings of
fact, would provide a meaningful basis for judicial review of sanctions.

2.

Factors Describing the Offense and the Offender

Formal recognition of the purposes served by sanctions provides,
at best, only a general directive to guide Commission discretion.
Realization of the dual sanctioning objectives of individualized justice
and equal treatment of like cases depends upon the Commission's
ability to describe not only the specific law violated, but also how it
was violated, and by whom. Thus, over the years, the Commission
has come to rely upon a series of factors that describe both the offense
and the offender. The importance of these factors becomes clear
when considered. in light or the remedial purpose of the Exchange
Act.
In determining the nature of an offense, the Commission considers not only the broad categories of fraud and nonfraud, but also the
particular types of fraud and nonfraud offenses; obviously, the general goal of protecting investors requires that some types of offenses
19. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (Supp. Aug.
1975); §§ 19(h)(l), (2), (3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78s(h)(1), (2), (3) (Supp. Aug.
1975).
80. It would, however, relieve the Commission from having to show that the
sanction was not punishment.
81. The case study revealed that some factors appeared to have been overlooked
in the decision process, even though the factors were discoverable. See SEC Case
Study, supra note 6, at 496; note is & text at notes 24-25 supra.
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be taken more seriously than others. 82 In addition to the type of offense committed, other factors tend to distinguish the more from the
less serious offenses. One such factor is the amount of money involved. Although far from a perfect indicator, the amount of money
involved may tend to help identify whether a particular offense poses
a threat to investors. One finding of the case study, however, was that,
though the Commission has acknowledged the importance of this
factor in determining appropriate sanctions, 83 the amount of money
involved was considered in relatively few cases.84 The same observation can be made about two other factors that describe and thus
distinguish offenses-the number of investors involved and the geographic scope of the violation. All else being equal, an offense that
involves relatively few investors and that is limited to one transaction
in one town may reasonably be viewed as a less serious threat to
investors than an offense involving thousands of investors nationally.
As in the case of the amount of money, however, these factors appear
to have been considered in far fewer cases than may have been
possible. 85 Since the Commission clearly recongnizes the potential
relevance of these factors, 86 a rule that seeks to limit the Commission's discretion in order to ensure more uniform consideration of
relevant factors ought to include them as appropriate for the Commission's consideration.
The amount of money involved in an offense is a factor that is
related to, but distinguishable from, the ultimate financial loss to
investors. Although a large sum may have been involved, there may
have been no resulting loss to investors; for example, a violation of
the net capital rule87 involves "an amount of money," but does not
necessarily result in any loss to investors. Even in those cases in
which the offense involves placing the investor's money in direct
82. The case study grouped offenses in eight categories: (1) egregious fraud; (2)
less egregious fraud; (3) egregious fraud and nonfraud combined; ( 4) less egregious
fraud and nonfraud combined; (5) sale of unregistered securities; (6) back office
violations; (7) nonfraud combining (5) and (6) above; and (8) failure to supervise.
In general, it was found that the more serious the offense, the more severe the
sanction. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 477-84.
83. See, e.g., Irving Friedman, 43 S.E.C. 314,323 n.19 (1967).
84. Only 16.6 per cent of all cases mentioned the amount of money. See SEC
Case Study, supra note 6, at 482.
85. Only 5.5 per cent of the cases mentioned the number of investors involved,
and only 8.4 per cent mentioned the geographic scope. See SEC Case Study, supra
note 6, at 483.
86. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. SEC Exchange Act Release
No. 8333 (June 14, 1968) (geographic scope); Thomas Brown, m, 43 S.E.C. 28.5
(1967) (number of investors).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1975). The rule is intended to ensure a firm's
liquidity by requiring that aggregate indebtedness not exceed 2000 per cent of its net
capital,
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jeopardy, such as sales by fraud, there may be no loss if the offender
has made, or has offered :to make, restitution to the victim. 88 If
restitution is allowed to become an automatic mitigating factor, however, the protection of investors may ultimately be threatened because
brokers may come to consider restitution merely a cost of doing
business, 89 Nevertheless, the offender's willingness to make restitution is a relevant factor when considered in conjunction with the
primary purpose of sanctions-to protect investors rather than to
punish offenders.
In addition to factors that describe the offense, the Commission
has taken into account certain factors that tend to describe the
offender; one such factor is the offender's attitude. The Exchange
Act requires only that the misconduct be intentional before a sanction
is imposed. 90 However, if the Commission finds a degree of willfulness greater than the statutory minimum, it should view this finding
as relevant to the sanctioning purpose-the protection of investors. 01
The offender's attitude may also be considered in terms of his
willingness to reform. For example, a broker-dealer who has violated
the Exchange Act by failing to supervise properly the sales practices of registered representatives may indicate his willingness to
comply with the Act's requirements in the future by instituting improved procedures to supervise the sales force. 02 Similarly, the willingness of an offender to be retrained and closely supervised as a
condition to being permitted to reenter the business indicates an
attitude consistent with the Commission's remedial objectives.03 Furthermore, an offender's willingness to consent to the imposition of a
sanction may be an appropriate determinant of sanction severity to
the extent that it demonstrates recognition of the law's requirements
and a willingness to comply in the future. 94
In addition to factors that describe the offender's attitude, the
Commission also considers factors that describe his status. Former
violations, for instance, are relevant to the extent that they tend to
establish the likelihood of future offenses and, therefore, indicate
88. See, e.g., Boettcher & Co., 43 S.E.C. 875 (1968).
89. Cf. GoJdschmid, supra note 78, at 946-47 (money penalties).
90. It has been said that willfulness "characterizes an act as being neither
unintentional or inadvertent." E. Wmss, supra note 9, at 206.
91. Id. at 204.
92. See, e.g., Boettcher & Co., 43 S.E.C. 875 (1968).
93. See, e.g., Roy V. Montgomery, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8223 (Jan. 3,
1968). Indeed, willingness to reform was one of the factors most likely to mitigate
the severity of sanction. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 486-87.
94. Willingness to consent appeared in 66.3 per cent of all cases and tended to be
associated with a reduction in expulsion rate. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at
485-86.
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future danger to investors generally.95 The age and experience of the
offender can also be relevant;96 however, the case study revealed
that these factors were not considered by the Commission as often
as was possible.97 Accordingly, including age and experience as
factors required by rule to be considered by the Commission, might
help to ensure that they are weighed when appropriate. The individual's general reputation in the industry is yet another factor that,
when objectively identified, ought to be, and is, considered by the
Commission in imposing sanctions.98
The factors described above are not necessarily the only ones that
might be appropriate for the Commission's consideration. They are,
however, relied upon by the Commission, and in many cases they are
relevant factors in determining a sanction that will further the public
interest. Moreover, no single factor is controlling; the combination
of factors in any particular case must be considered to determine the
appropriate weight to be given to each factor individually. Although
it might be possible for regulated individuals to distill from SEC
practice those factors the Commission is likely to consider, a rule is
needed that will articulate the relevant factors that affect sanction
severity so that they may be both known and knowable; furthermore,
such a rule should require that the Commission consider these factors
in each case in which they are present, thereby providing a formal
standard to guide discretion that will be applicable to all. The
formulation and publication of such a rule would not only guide the
Commission, but would also serve as notice to regulated parties and
provide a basis for judicial review.
3.

Procedural Requirements of a Rule

If a rule of the type described is to provide an effective limit on
the exercise of sanctioning discretion, it should include a requirement
that the Commission make findings, supported by substantial evi95. See, e.g., Strathmore Sec., Inc., 43 S.E.C. 575, 591 (1967).
96. See, e.g., David G. Baird, 43 S.E.C."815 (1968).
97. Age was mentioned in 2.6 per cent of the cases; experience was mentioned in
11.6 per cent of the cases. SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 491.
98. Id. at 490-91. This is not to suggest that reputation, in and of itself, should
determine the necessity of a sanction. Reputation is a valid criterion only when it
tends to assist the Commission in determining the remedial necessity of a sanction.
Thus, good reputation subsequent to a violation may be relevant to the ultimate
determination of rehabilitation. Likewise, a history of scrapes with the law may
indicate a pattern of behavior that is likely to endanger investors in the future. There
is no question that reputation is a slippery factor. Only when reliable, objective
evidence of reputation tends to support the remedial determination should it be
considered.
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dence, 99 with regard to each relevant factor stated in the rule. Further, the Commission should be required to articulate, as part of its
reasons for imposing a sanction, the sanctioning purpose hoped to be
achieved. 100 These procedural requirements are essential if the
scheme is to be workable. In order to make judicial review possible,
the Commission must support its application of the formal standard
by indicating its factual findings and the relation between those
findings and the sanction imposed.
It is true, of course, that the SEC already makes findings and
offers reasons for its sanctions pursuant to the public interest standard. However, presently the Commission is not required to account
for all of the factors that past practice has established are relevant in
determining an appropriate sanction in similar cases; nor is it required to articulate all of the factors that it considered relevant in
imposing a sanction in the particular case. Rather, under existing
practice, the Commission is free to select some factors as a justification for its decision while ignoring (or failing to mention) others.
Thus, the case study showed that, while all cases disclosed some
factors upon which the sanctioning decision was based, few, if any,
cases accounted for all of the discoverable factors that the SEC had
found relevant in similar cases. Consequently, the rational basis for
the Commission's sanctioning decisions is suspect. Moreover, the
case study showed that the factors utilized by the Commission were
applied inconsistently, resulting in an over-all disparity.
The deficiencies in the Commission's present practice can be
illustrated by considering two approaches to sanctioning based on the
following hypothetical: An experienced, middle-aged salesman with
no prior record is found to have sold $100,000 worth of securities by
fraud. He has offered to make restitution. Under the first approach,
the salesman would receive thirty-days suspension because he has
been employed as a salesman for twenty-five years without any prior
violation, and no loss has been suffered by the investors. Under this
approach, suspension is viewed as an adequate remedy to protect
investors and further the public interest. Under the second approach,
the salesman would be expelled. In spite of his offer of restitution,
99. The substantial evidence standard is generally used by the courts in reviewing
findings of fact made by federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970).
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). A reviewing court must sustain
the agency's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole, taking "into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight" Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
100. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 43.
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the seriousness of the offense and large amount of money involved
would require :that the salesman be barred from association with a
broker-dealer for the protection of investors. When viewed in isolation, either of these alternatives is rational. Note, however, that
under the first approach the amount of money involved and the
seriousness of the offense are ignored and the emphasis is instead
placed on the lack of a prior record and the offer of restitution. On
the other hand, under the second approach, the amount of money
involved and the seriousness of the offense are held to outweigh the
offer of restitution, and the offender's long spotless record is ignored.
Moreover, neither approach considers the offender's intent or the
number of investors involved. Thus, neither takes into account all of
the discoverable factors that the SEC has found relevant in similar
circumstances. Finally, by failing to account for all of the relevant
factors, neither approach provides a rationale that adequately explains
the purpose or necessity for the particular sanction imposed. The
result is inconsistent treatment, not of arguably similar cases, but of
the same case.101
The rule that will be proposed will not automatically remove all
elements of disparity and inconsistency from the sanctioning process.
Nonetheless, a requirement that the Commission make findings with
regard to each relevant factor stated in the rule, and support the
imposition of a sanction with reasons in light of those factors, will aid
in the elimination of gross disparities and unreasoned decisions.

C.

A Proposed Rule and Statutory Amendment

In light of the preceding discussion and the findings of the case
study, it is recommended that the Commission (by rule) or Congress
(by amendment to ·the Exchange Act) formulate standards to guide
the exercise of SEC sanctioning discretion. Section 23(a) of the
Exchange Act102 empowers the Commission to promulgate such a
rule, and the following may be a reasonable starting point:
Proposed Rule 15b4-1
Imposition of Sanctions Under Sections 15(b) and 19(h)(2), (3)
of the Act:
(a) In determining an appropriate sanction in any proceeding
pursuant to sections 15(b) or 19(h)(2), (3) of the Act, the Commission will support its decision to impose ( or not to impose) a sanc101. For examples of this kind of use of the factors, compare Van Alstyne, Noel
& Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080 (1969), with Charles P. Lawrence, 43 S.E.C. 607 (1967).

102. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a), 15 U.S.C, § 78w(a) (1970).
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tion with adequate findings and reasons to show that it has considered
the purpose of the sanction, as well as all relevant factors describing
the offense and the offender.
(1) The remedial purposes that a sanction may serve shall
include: (A) the protection of investors; (B) the general and
special deterrence of future violations; and (C) the encouragement of voluntary compliance with the Act or the rehabilitation
of offenders.
(2) Factors describing the offense shall include: (A) the
seriousness of the offense; (B) the number of investors involved
or affected; (C) the amount of money involved; (D) the financial losss, actual or threatened, to investors; (E) the profit to the
offender; (F) the geographic scope of the violation; and (G) all
other relevant factors consistent with the purposes of this Act.
(3) Factors describing the offender shall include: (A)
former violations; (B) general reputation in the industry; (C)
age and experience in the securities business; (D) willfulness of
the offense; (E) willingness to reform or make restitution; and
(F) all other relevant factors consistent with the purpose of this
Act.
(b) In the case of an individual, bar will be an appropriate sanction where--(1) there is a reasonable likelihood that the respondent will
continue to violate the securities laws; or
(2) there was an intentional or gross disregard for the requirement of the securities laws; or
(3) for other good cause shown.
(c) In the case of a registered broker-dealer, revocation will be
an appropriate sanction where-(1) there was substantial participation by management in the
violation under circumstances stated in (b) above; or
(2) there was gross disregard of the duty to supervise prescribed by Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Act; or
(3) for other good cause shown.
(d) In the case of financial loss to investors, restitution or an offer of restitution will not mitigate the offense, except for good cause
shown, when bar or revocation would otherwise be an appropriate
sanction pursuant to the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of
this rule.
(e) Any person whose registration has been revoked or who has
been barred from association with a broker-dealer may petition the
Commission for a hearing to consider readmission to •the securities
business. No such petition may be considered earlier than one year
after the imposition of the sanction. The Commission will support
its decision to deny a hearing, or to deny readmission after a hearing,
with finqings and conclusions not inconsistent with the purpose of this
Act or this rule.
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(f) In any proceedings pursuant to this rule, the Com.mission will
explain departures from prior policy, whether that policy is embodied
in written opinions or otherwise.

The proposed rule is designed to limit the exercise of Commission
discretion without sacrificing the necessary element of flexibility. It
imposes two principal obligations upon the Commission. First, the
Commission must make findings that describe both the offense and
the offender. Second, the Commission must demonstrate the necessity of imposing a sanction in light of its findings and the remedial
purposes served by sanctions. In general, the rule requires the SEC
to base its decision on findings supported by substantial evidence and
to offer reasons for its conclusion consistent with the statutory purpose. Departures from some of the rule's specific requirements are
permitted when the SEC can demonstrate that such departures are
not inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Act and administrative sanctions generally. The rule thus provides not only a guide
for the Commission, but also a basis for judicial review.
Paragraphs (b) and ( c) of the rule are intended to regularize the
basic circumstances in which bar and revocation are appropriate.
They attempt to avoid an emphasis, inadvertent or otherwise, on
punishment for the sake of punishment. Paragraph (e) is based on
the same remedial philosophy. It recognizes that a given offender
may show that he is no longer a threat either to investors or to the
maintenance of fair markets. 103 The existing concept -inherent in
revocation or bar-once a danger to investors, always a danger to
investors--does not accord with reality; this notion of the "incorrigible" offender seems to shift the emphasis to punishment as the
primary sanctioning purpose.104
Paragraph (d) is intended to ensure that restitution will serve as a
mitigating factor only in those cases in which it is supportive of the
statutory purpose. Paragraph (f) is intended to assist in developing
reasonable certainty and consistency in the sanctioning process without depriving the Commission of the flexibility necessary to adjust its
policies to changing industry circumstances and enforcement needs.
The practical question, of course, is whether the SEC (or Congress) will proceed along the lines suggested on its own motion. The
remainder of this Article is concerned with the judicial action that
may appropriately be taken if the SEC does not so respond.
103. The Commission already acknowledges the validity of this general concept in
a sanction it "created": bar with the right to petition for re-entry. See, e.g., Ellis
Friend, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,026 (Sept. 24, 1974); Cenco Investors &
Associates, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10,962 (Aug. 14, 1974); Cortlandt
Investing Corp., 44 S.E.C. 45 (1969).
104, See, e.g., Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970),
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JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF SANCTIONING DISCRETION

The role of the judiciary in controlling the exercise of administrative sanctioning discretion will necessarily vary depending upon the
action (or inaction) taken by Congress and the SEC. Thus, we must
first ask whether the courts can require either Congress or the SEC to
articulate formal standards and whether such standards, if required,
must be embodied in formal regulations. Second, we must focus on
the problem of judicial review of standards that have been adopted by
the SEC. Finally, we must examine some of the constitutional
difficulties that may be raised by present SEC sanctioning practice.
A.

1udicial Requirement of Standards To Guide Discretion

A judicial requirement of known standards to guide sanctioning
discretion might take either of two forms. First, the courts might
resurrect or modify the nondelegation doctrine in order to require
Congress or the Commission to promulgate standards in the form of
regulations; second, the courts might require that sanctioning standards be articulated, at a minimum, via agency adjudication.

1. The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Vehicle for Requiring Standards
Could ·the courts utilize the nondelegation doctrine in order to
require Congress to set forth meaningful sanctioning standards in the
Exchange Act? Professor Davis, perhaps speaking for a majority,
has said that "[t]he non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete
failure . . . . The time has come for the courts to acknowledge that
the . . . doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to
protect against arbitrary administrative power."105 In spite of such
sentiments, at least one distinguished jurist, Judge Wright, believes
that "the reported demise of the doctrine is a bit premature."100
Although Judge Wright rejects the proposition that Congress cannot
delegate any legislative power to the executive branch or an independent agency, he has stated that "Congress should [not] be permitted,
in effect, to vote itself out of business"107 by passing on to nonelected
officials the power to determine fundamental policy. He suggests
that the nondelegation doctrine, "[a]t its core, . • . is based on the
notion that agency action must occur within the context of a rule of
law previously formulated by a legislative body." 108 Accordingly, he
105.
106.
107.
108.

K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.00, at 40 (Supp. 1970).
Wright, Book Review, 81

Id.
Id. at 583.

YALE

LJ. 515, 582 (1972).
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cites with approval the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Arizona v. California100-an opinion that suggests that the issue is not
the delegation of legislative power per se, but the delegation of "unrestrained authority."110 Justice Harlan further suggests that the doctrine so understood serves two purposes: "First, it insures that the
fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an
appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the
people. Second, it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an
exercise at large by providing the courts with some measure against
which to judge the official action that has been challenged."111
The medts of Justice Harlan's second purpose seem self-evident.
The merits of his first purpose, however, depend on the use of the
words "fundamental policy" to distinguish those decisions that may
not be made by an appointed official from those decisions that may
be so made. Apparently, the words are used to avoid the clearly
erroneous position that the Constititution forbids any policy formulation by a body other than Congress. 112 The problem, though, is
determining the difference between a "fundamental policy" and any
other kind of policy. Are the standards that guide sanctioning
practice themselves matters of fundamental policy that must be set by
Congress and not by the SEC?113 Or is the fundamental policy
involved only that the s_ecurities industry be regulated and that sanctions for violations be imposed? If, as is likely, it is the second
question that must be answered in the affirmative, then it would seem
that Congress has fulfilled its obligation, and the courts, even accepting Justice Harlan's theory, should not,use the nondelegation doctrine
to require Congress to articulate standards to guide SEC sanctioning
discretion.
An early claim that the SEC's sanctioning power was an unlawful
delegation "because the statute declares no standards to guide" the
selection of an appropriate sanction was rejected by the Second
Circuit.11 4 In that case, Judge Swan noted that "Congress has defined the conduct that is unlawful . . . ,"115 and the " 'protection of
investors' is a sufficiently definite criterion to guide the Commis109. 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963).
110. 373 U.S. at 626.
111. 373 U.S. at 626 (emphasis omitted).
112. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.00-3 (Supp. 1970) (surveying the
traditional practice of delegating power).
113. If this is the case, it would surely seem inconsistent with judicial approval of
standardless sentencing authority for juries. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971).
114. Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (1940).
115. 112 F.2d at 94.
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sion."116 Subsequently, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
public interest standard in an SEC case, noting not only that it would
be "unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe
detailed rules . . • ,"117 but also that the standard was "constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy."118
Presumably, the Court meant by "general policy" the same thing that
Justice Harlan meant by "fundamental policy." It is unlikely, therefore, that the traditional formulation of the nondelegation doctrine
can be utilized in this context.
A related question is whether the courts can use a variation of the
nondelegation doctrine to require the SEC to promulgate rules. Professor Davis has suggested that the courts should modify the nondelegation doctrine by requiring agencies to engage in rule-making to
supply the necessary standards that are ·otherwise lacking in the
enabling legislation. Thus, rather than use the nondelegation doctrine to strike down legislation in which Congress has not supplied
adequate standards, Professor Davis would use the doctrine to require
the agencies to promulgate more definite standards.119
Although Professor Davis' suggestion is innovative, it has been
seriously criticized.120' Its problems are both practical and theoretical. Some commentators have focused on the practical problems of
required rule-making. 121 Would mandated rule-making, for instance,
obligate an agency to engage in rule-making procedures whenever the
enabling legislation granted discretion, or would the agencies continue to be able to develop some standards in adjudicative proceedings? In any event, how would. the courts determine whether the rule
promulgated was as specific as was necessary or feasible? Would
required rule-making result in unreasonable demands upon the limited resources of already overworked agencies?
Answers to these questions depend, to a large extent, upon the
particular agency (as well as the particular functions of an agency)
under consideration. 122 For example, as applied to the SEC's sanctioning practice, a requirement that the agency utilize rule-making
procedures to formulate standards to guide discretion would not place
116. 112 F.2d at 95. Judge Swan relied on a Supreme Court decision that had
held that the 1cpublic interest" standard (for the ICC) "is not a concept without
ascertainable criteria" in the context of the obvious statutory purposes. New York
Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932).
117. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
118. 329 U.S. at 105.
119. See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 27-51.
120. See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 38.
121. See Sofaer, supra note 32, at 1309-12.
122, See generally text at notes 30·43 supra,
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an unreasonable demand on the resources of the agency; rather, it
would require the SEC to codify, regularize, and improve its existing
practices in the form of a public rule. In the long run, the rule would
probably result in a time savings because the inquiry of the decisionmaker, as well as affected parties, would be directed to the rule as a
guide to argumentation and opinion-writing.
Further, the standards promulgated under required rule-making
would not necessarily result in the elimination of adjudication as a
proper vehicle for developing policy and standards. The rule recommended above, for instance, specifically guarantees the SEC the
flexibility to develop standards in adjudication. When the developing
policy of an agency becomes routinized, however, all parties concerned benefit by the codification and publication of the policy in ,a
formal rule; such publication is an aid not only to efficiency, but also
to judicial review of the sanctioning process.123 The potential danger
in required rule-making is not that the rules ultimately 'adopted would
necessarily eliminate flexibility, but that a rigid application of the
rule-making requirement-if, for example, the courts required all
discretion to be controlled by standards in the form of rules124--could
eliminate the agency's flexibility to decide whether to proceed by
adjudication or rule-making. Such a result, however unlikely, would
be clearly undesirable. Rule-making (as opposed to adjudication) is
not necessarily desirable, practicable, or necessary in every situation
in which an agency has discretion. 1215 Judicial intervention to determine when an agency ought to develop policy by rule-making rather
than adjudication should be guided by existing judicial tests that
recognize the appropriate role for both forms of law-making.126
Although the practical problems that might arise from required
rule-making would not cause insurmountable difficulties .in the case
of SEC sanctioning practice, required rule-making based on the
nondelegation doctrine has a basic theoretical weakness. Regardless
of one's preferred approach to nondelegation, the doctrine is not, as a
matter of definition, responsive to the problem. If nondelegation
means that Congress may not delegate legislative power,127 then the
123. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598
(D.C. Cir. 1971), where Chief Judge Bazelon notes that "principled decision-making"
by agencies would "diminish the importance of judicial review • • • ."
124. The courts have never adopted this position. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Intl. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960). '
125. See text at notes 30-43 supra.
126. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947). See generally
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 485 (1970).
127. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
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problem of an unlawful delegation of authority is not cured by
permitting an agency to determine standards to delimit the boundaries of power that it should not have been given to begin with. If, on
the other hand, it is both constitutionally proper and also, as a
practical matter, necessary that Congress delegate legislative power to
an agency (assuming Congress has made the fundamental policy
determinations), 128 then delegation is no longer the issue. The problem is not a question of the validity of delegating power, but of
controlling the exercise of agency power that has been validly delegated. If, as Professor Davis suggests, the nondelegation doctrine
"had to fail, should have failed, and did fail," 120 why not be done
with it? Why twist the doctrine further by attempting to apply it to a
problem for which it was never intended? The attempt to find a basis
for requiring standards to guide the exercise of agency discretion
ought not to be rooted in an unnecessary complication of past mistakes.
To reject the nondelegation doctrine as a basis for mandating
either agency rule-making or legislative action, however, is not to say
that there is no judicial role in this area. The appropriate and logical
source of a requirement that an agency articulate standards to guide
sanctioning discretion is the due process clause. 130

2.

The Due Process Clause as a Vehicle for Requiring Standards

The due process clause is "intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."131 Although the
way in which this principle applies to administrative agency activities
is not always clear, it has been established that, for example, an
administrative proceeding to revoke a license is subject to due process
requirements.132 Thus, at a minimu~, the licensee is entitled to notice
and an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."133 Due process also includes the right to have
one's conduct judged by known standards, for, almost by definition,
without standards there is no law.134 Power without standards to
128. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
129. K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.00-3, at 46 (Supp. 1970).
130. Professor Davis predicts that the nondelegation doctrine (as modified to
require agency rule-making) "will merge with the concept of due process ••••" Id.,
§ 2.00-6, at 58. Surely the standards requirement ought to begin with the due process
clause, not grow out of nondelegation.
131. Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 17-U.S. 235,244 (1819).
132. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,238 (1957).
133. Armstrong v. -Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
134. See Wright, supra note 106, at 589.
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govern its exercise is "an intolerable invitation to abuse," and "[f]or
this reason alone due process requires . • . 'ascertainable standards'.
"135

The question remains, however, whether these principles should
be applied to administrative sanctioning practice. Although a court
would hardly tolerate an agency's determination of misconduct unless
there existed a meaningful and ascertainable standard by which to
measure the offender's actions, courts tend to be satisfied with very
little in the way of standards to guide sanction selection; often, all that
is necessary is the agency's certification that the particular sanction is
necessary "in the public interest." Thus, in reviewing an SEC sanction, the Second Circuit dismissed the offenders' challenge simply by
concluding that "the sanctions imposed upon the petitioners were well
within the Commission's discretion."136 The fact that a sanction is
within the range of the Commission's discretion, however, ought not
to end the due process inquiry. Did the agency demonstrate the
necessity of the particular sanction imposed? What factors did the
agency consider? How have comparable cases been dealt with? What
is the nature of the offense and the offender? In short, what standards, if any, controlled the sanction's selection? The courts' reluctance to require the articulation of the standards and factors that guide
the exercise of sanctioning discretion is, in effect, judicial acquiescence in governmental taking of property and liberty without standards, which is to say, without law.
It is an insufficient answer to say that judicial reluctance to
require the articulation of standards for sanctioning decisions is due
to the numerous and diverse factors that lead to a particular sanctioning choice. 137 Numerous and diverse factors must be considered by
administrative agencies in many of the decisions that are made in the
process of adjudication, and such adjudicative decisions are often no
less complex than the decision to impose a sanction. The practicability of articulating standards in the light of statutory purposes, the
SEC's need for flexibility, and the public interest in consistency have
been discussed above. 138 Further, the fear that reviewing courts will
substitute their opinions for the sanctioning decisions of the agency139
should not insulate courts from fulfilling their duty to ensure that
135. Holmes v. Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968), quoting
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964).
136. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (1967).
137. Cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,204 (1971).
138. See text at notes 30-43 supra.
139. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
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the powers of government are exercised lawfully. The adoption of
the due process basis for review of sanctions requires only that the
reviewing court insist that valid criteria be articulated and applied by
the agency in :r;eaching its decision.
To say that the courts should require agencies to articulate standards is not necessarily to say that those standards must be articulated
in formal regulations. 140 After all, rules governing conduct can be
known and knowable not only if they are articulated in statutes and
regulations, but also if they can be found in the opinions of judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies. At a minimum, however, standards must be
fairly deducible from such opinions. In this context, the importance
of a requirement that agency sanctions be supported by clear reasons
is apparent: 141 A statement of reasons both provides the necessary
basis for judicial review142 and serves the broader jurisprudential
purpose of making the law known and knowable.
Although the statement of reasons requirement can be supported
simply by reference to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 143 its basis in the due process clause should be acknowledged so
that it cannot be construed to be merely a matter of legislative grace.
At least one Supreme Court decision has based the statement of
reasons requirement on the due process clause. 144 Indeed, it would
be ironic if a defendant has the right to be told of the charges against
him, but no corresponding right to be told why a sanction was being
imposed.
Whatever else happens in the legal process, the imposition of a
140. Both Professor Davis and Judge Wright suggest that due process might
provide a basis for requiring rule-making. See K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.00-6
(Supp. 1970); Wright, supra note 106, at 588.
141. It is generally held that a court may require a statement of reasons from an
agency. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). Furthermore, the
courts have required agencies to state their reasons clearly. See Secretary of
Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 654 (1954); United States v. Chicago, M.,
St. P. & Pac. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d
730, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1961); Kahn v.
SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring).
142. The practical significance of a statement of reasons as a prerequisite to
meaningful judicial review is obvious. As Justice Cardozo stated, "We must know
what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or
wrong." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970). The Act's reasons requirement does not apply to
all agency actions, but it does apply to the SEC's sanctioning process under consideration because the imposition of sanctions represents agency action that is "required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing • • • ."
5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970). The Exchange Act specifically requires a finding of the
public interest prior to the imposition of a sanction, "on the record after notice and
opportunity for hearing ••••" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15(b) (4), (5),
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o(b)(4), (5) (Supp. Aug. 1975).
144. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 551 (1966).
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sanction is, from the respondent's point of view, probably the single
most important event; however, under existing conditions, it is the
one event that is least controlled by the rule of law. If a system of
law and due process of law are to be given meaning, they must be
defined in terms of the reasoned regulation of human conduct by
known standards. Reason alone will not guarantee that the law will
be right in any absolute sense, but the failure to include articulated
reasons and standards as a requirement of government action makes
fully possible arbitrary, capricious, and, thus, unlawful government
action. Even if standards and reasons are articulated, however, the
possibility of abuse is not necessarily eliminated, since the standards
adopted (and the reasons articulated in applying such standards)
must be proper and must be properly utilized.

B.

Judicial Review of Administrative Formulation and Utilization
of Standards

Although the debate continues regarding the extent to which the
Administrative Procedure Act precludes review of matters committed
to agency discretion, 145 it appears that SEC sanctioning discretion is
reviewable for abuse. 146 As noted briefly above,1 47 however, the
145. The source of the debate is the apparent conflict between two provisions of
the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (19'70), which precludes review "to the extent that
..• agency action is committed to agency discretion by law," and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(A) (1970), which requires a reviewing court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency
actions, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law •.•." A spirited dialogue on
the question was engaged in by Professor Davis and Raoul Berger. See Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965);
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 783 (1966); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 814 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor
Davis' "Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REv. 816 (1966); Davis, Administrative
Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 823 (1966); Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness-A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REv. 601 (1967); Davis, Administrative
Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REY. 643 ·(1967). While the
Supreme Court has held that the exception from reviewability is a narrow one, see
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), that case
does not completely resolve the conflict. See Mahinka, The Problem of Nonreviewability: Judicial Control of Action Committed to Agency Discretion, 20 VILL. L. REV.
1 (1974).
146. See, e.g., Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1970); Armstrong, Jones &
Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359,365 (6th Cir. 1970); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211,217 (9th
Cir. 1969).
Even if one follows Professor Davis' somewhat restrictive interpretation of the
APA, SEC sanctioning discretion seems reviewable. Applying Professor Davis' twopart inquiry for determining reviewability, (1) it is clear that no "congressional intent
is discernible to make [a sanction] unreviewable," and (2) "the subject matter is . . .
[appropriate] for judicial consideration." K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 965
(Supp. 1970). There is no language in section 15(b) of the Exchange Act that
precludes review of sanctions, and section 25(a) of the Exchange Act specifically
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courts seem unwilling to do much more than ensure that the sanction
imposed is within the permissible statutory range of discretion. 148
Is it practicable for the courts to do more? In Wong Wing Hang
v. Immigration and Natural.ization Service, 149 Judge Friendly found
that the courts could invalidate discretionary agency actions that
"were made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed
from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as
an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group, or,
. . . on other 'considerations that Congress could not have intended
to make relevant.' " 150 Although Judge Friendly did not attempt to
provide a "comprehensive definition"151 of abuse of agency discretion, the formula that he did provide seems, to suggest two primary
bases for judicial inquiry. First, discretionary action must be rational,
and second, discretionary action must be consistent with relevant
legal standards, whether the source of such standards is administrative, statutory, or constitutional.152 If this formula is applied to SEC
provides for review of Commission orders. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78y(a) (Supp. Aug,
1975). Further, the subject matter seems to require the kind of inquiries that
"legally-trained judges, limited to the process that courts customarily use, are qualified
to do." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExr § 28.05, at 515-16 (1972), Moreover,
if due process requires standards to guide discretion, there would appear to be "law to
apply,'' the test suggested by the Supreme Court in Citizens To Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971).
147. See text at note 136 supra.
148. See, e.g., Don D. Anderson & Co. v. SEC, 423 F.2d 813, 817 (10th Cir,
1970); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 365 (6th Cir. 1970); Nees v.
SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 217 (9th Cir. 1969); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.
1967); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Pierce v. SEC, 239 F.2d 160, 16364 (9th Cir. 1956); Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir, 1940).
A 1973 Supreme Court decision reiterated an arguably broader rule for reviewing
an administrative sanction. A sanction may be reviewed only if " 'unwarranted in law
or . . . without justification in fact • • • .' " Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co.,
411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973 ), quoting American Power & Light Co, v. SEC, 329 U.S.
90, 112-13 (1946). Scrutiny of the factual basis for imposing a sanction is clearly
justified. See text at note 176 infra. Whether a sanction is "warranted in law"
would seem to permit an inquiry broader than a mere determination that the sanction
is within the permissible statutory range of choices. The possible avenues such a
broadened inquiry might take is the subject of the discussion that follows. Tho
application of the ''warrant in law" test in Butz was limited to a determination that
the sanction there imposed was within the Secretary's range of authority and that such
a sanction was "not rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe
than sanctions imposed in other cases." 411 U.S. at 187.
149. 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966).
150. 360 F.2d at 719, quoting United States ex rel, Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180
F.2d 489,491 (2d Cir. 1950).
151. 360 F.2d at 719.
152. The Wong case itself exemplifies the first principle: "Wong contends that
the determination here • • . is internally inconsistent-he was found to have possessed 'good moral character' during the several years prior to his application , • • yet
was faulted for prevarication . . . during that same period," 360 F.2d at 719. Judge
Friendly, in effect, gives three examples of the second principle: (1) inexplicable
departures from agency policy; (2) invidious discrimination (constitutional); and (3)
considerations Congress could not have intended to make relevant (statutory),
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sanctioning discretion, it is obvious that a particular sanction either
may lack a rational explanation or may be inconsistent with agency
policy or with statutory or constitutional principles. It would seem,
then, that SEC sanctioning discretion ought to be subject to a level of
judicial inquiry that extends beyond the initial determination that the
sanction is within the statutory range of the Commission's discretion.15s
Undoubtedly, the reluctance of the federal judiciary to inquire
into the propriety of a particular agency sanction is an outgrowth, in
part, of its experience in reviewing criminal sanctions. It has been
said that, "[i]f there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which
is firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a
sentence which is within the limits allowed by a statute."154 If one
closely inspects the actual federal practice, however, that observation
appears to be a slight overstatement. Although federal appellate
courts generally have been reluctant to review the propriety of a
sentence that is within the statutory limits,155 they have been willing
to intervene on occasion.156 A recent Sixth Circuit opinion, United
States v. Daniels, 151 suggests .the possible bases for review of criminal
sentences and, in so doing, offers a framework for review of administrative sanctions as well.
The court in Daniels suggested two exceptions to the general
federal rule of nonreviewability: 158 First, the reviewing court may
ascertain whether the trial court relied upon proper factors; and,
second, the reviewing court may determine whether the trial court
evaluated all of the relevant information about the offender in light of
the proper factors. 159 The court further suggested that the factors to
be considered include appropriate sentencing purposes, such as rehabilitation, protection of the public, discipline of the offender, and
deterrence of others.160 Thus, the court provided a test for reviewing
the appropriateness of a sentence even in cases in which the sentence
153. The power to sanction is not "the authority • . . to act blindly or arbitrarily . . . [or] in disregard of . . . limitations recognized by law." .ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Ac::r, l.EGISLATIVE HISTORY, s. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 368-69 (1946) (Chairman Walter explaining review provisions of APA prior to
adoption).
154. Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930). See United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,447 (1972).
155. See cases collected in Annot., 21 A.L.R. Fed. 655, 664-69 (1974).
156. See id. at 685-88.
157. 446 F.2d 967 (1971).
158. 446 F.2d at 969, citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
159. 446 F.2d at 970.
160. 446 F.2d at 972, citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 n.13
(1949).
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is within the permissible statutory range. The object of the test is to
achieve, as far as is feasible, a sanction that fits the offender. 161
The quality of judicial review of administrative sanctions would
be improved if the courts (and counsel) were more careful to analyze
the precise nature of ~ alleged abuse of discretion. The framework
suggested by the court in Daniels, in combination with Judge Friendly's "definition" of abuse of discretion, can provide the basis for such
analysis. In general, the court's attention should be directed to two
aspects of sanctioning practice: the propriety of the standards relied
upon by the agency in reaching a decision and the propriety of the
manner in which the standards were utilized. Because each of these
broad lines of inquiry includes more specific aspects, it is proposed
that the following outline of the test be used:
l.

Propriety of Sanctioning Standards

(a) Is the standard consistent with the relevant statutory purposes?
(b) Is the standard consistent with ,the remedial purposes of
sanctioning?
(c) Is the standard consistent with constitutional principles?

2.

ProjJriety of Utiliz.ation of Sanctioning Standards

(a) Are the agency's findings in respect to -the standard supported
by substantial evidence?
(b) Have all of the proper factors and standards been accounted
for in the agency's findings and reasons?
( c) Has ,the agency inexplicably departed from its established
sanctioning policy or practice?
(d) Are the reasons offered in support of the sanction internally
consistent?162

The court's initial step in evaluating the propriety of a standard
being used by the Commission should be to determine whether the
standard is consistent with the relevant statutory purposes. 108 This
161. 446 F.2d at 970, citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
162. Professor Davis has made a similar suggestion: "a) determine the reasona•
bleness of the rules • • • as a guide to discretion, • • • c) ascertain whether the
particular exercise of discretion arbitrarily departs from the administrative case law,
. • • f) determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, g)
determine whether the stated reasons are based upon considerations which are reasonable and legal." K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 981-82 (Supp. 1970).
163. This step would appear to be implicit in Judge Friendly'!/ "impermissible
basis ..• [or] 'considerations that Congress could not have intended • • • ,' " Wong
Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966);
Judge Celebrezze's "improper factors," United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 970
(6th Cir. 1971); or Davis' "reasons ••• based upon considerations which ai:e •••
legal,'' K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 982 (Supp. 1970).
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task is essentially one of statutory interpretation and thus is one that is
clearly appropriate for judicial consideration.164 The basic statutory
term to be construed in evaluating the propriety of SEC sanctioning
standards is "the public interest," since SEC sanctions must be imposed in light of that statutory standard._ In a different setting, the
Supreme Court has stated that "the term 'public interest' is not a
concept without ascertainable criteria . . . " 165 and must be construed in light of "[t]he purpose of the Act, the requirements it
imposes, and the context of the provision in question . . . ." 166 Thus,
for our purposes, "the public interest'' must be construed in light of
both the purpose of the Exchange Act (the protection of investors)
and the context in which the term applies (the imposition of sanctions). Obviously, even so construed, the term leaves the Commission with a great deal of leeway; however, it at least draws' an initial
boundary within which the Commission must stay. When the Commission imposes a sanction in reliance upon a factor that describes the
offense or the offender, that factor must be rationally related to the
remedial purposes of the Exchange Act. 167 Although most of the
factors relied upon by the Commission do appear to meet this test, 168
some of the factors used appear to be more questjonable. In particular, it might ,be appropriate to ask whether the offender's geographic
location (for example, New York) or professional affiliation (for
example, NYSE membership) are factors relevant to .the purposes of
the Exchange Act.
A second and related inquiry concerning the propriety of an
agency standard is whether the standard is consistent with appropriate
sanctioning purposes.169 As in the case of statutory purposes, the
scope of permissible sanctioning purposes allows the Commission a
wide range of discretion (and justification) in imposing sanctions.
164. K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16 at 965 (Supp. 1970).
165. New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932)
(interpreting the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456).
166. 287 U.S. at 24. See American Power & Light, Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 10405 (1946).
167. The SEC must, of coup;e, properly interpret those purposes. Problems of
interpretation and application of law are discussed in NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L REv. 470, 473-75 (1950).
168. See text at notes 82-98 supra.
169. This inquiry was of obvious importance to the court in Daniels, which said,
"[W]e are disturbed by the District Cou11's failure to conceive of the sentencing
procedure in terms of the modern penological philosophy praised by the United States
Supreme Court," and listed the following factors as appropriate sentencing considerations: "(a) the ref6rmation of the offender, (b) the protection of society, (c) the
disciplining of the wrongdoer, and (d) the deterrence of others .•.." United States
v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 1971), citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 248 n.13 (1949).
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Nevertheless, requiring that the standard be measured in light of
appropriate sanctioning purposes does limit SEC action. In Beck,
for example, the court of appeals overruled the Commission because
the purpose of the sanction was punitive and therefore inappropriate.170 The topic of appropriate sanctioning purposes was discussed earlier,171 and there is no need to repeat that analysis here. It
would seem however, that because sanctioning purposes may affect
the nature and necessity of a particular sanction in any given case, it
is appropriate for the courts to inquire about a sanction's purpose. 172
Finally, the court may evaluate the propriety of sanctioning standards in light of relevant constitutional principles. This line of
inquiry is consistent with Judge Friendly's statement that an abuse of
discretion would occur if a decision "rested on an impermissible basis
such as an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.
" 173 Judge Friendly's "impermissible basis" standard clearly
comprehends a challenge to one or more sanctioning standards on the
ground that such standards are constitutionally defective. Inquiries
into the constitutional validity of sanctioning standards are particularly appropriate for judicial determination.174 Thus, a standard that
infringes upon constitutional rights (including, for example, the freedoms of speech or religion) should be subject to challenge notwithstanding that the imposition of sanctions is action "committed to
agency discretion by law."175
The second broad line of inquiry a court should make in reviewing an administrative sanction is to evaluate the manner in which
sanctioning standards are utilized. In the Commission's case, this
could prove to be the most important inquiry. In evaluating the
170. Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970), discussed in text at notes 48-59
supra.
171. See text at notes 46-81 supra.
172. Even if one disagrees with the particular result of the case, Beck demonstrates the feasibility of such an inquiry. See Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir.
1970). In Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 187 (1973), the
Supreme Court implicitly recognized the appropriateness of an inquizy into the
relation of the sanction to statutozy purpose: "[T]he breadth of the grant of authority
to impose the sanction strongly implies a congressional purpose to permit the
Secretazy to impose it to deter repeated violations of the Act, whether intentional or
negligent." Further, "[t]he Secretary's practice, rather, apparently is to employ that
sanction as in his judgment best serves to deter violations and achieve the objectives
of that statute." 411 U.S. at 187-88. Finally, the Court cited approvingly the
statement of the court of appeals that judicial review is available to determine whether
the sanction " 'bears a reasonable relation to the practice sought to be eliminated .
• . .•" 411 U.S. at 186, n.3, quoting 454 F.2d 109, 114 (1972).
173. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719
(2d Cir. 1966).
174. See K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 975 (Supp. 1970).
175. Judge Wright also warns of the danger of standardless regulation that "chills
the exercise of constitutional rights." Wright, supra note 106, at 589.
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utilization of a sanctioning standard (assuming that the standard is
itself proper), a court should initially question whether the Commission's findings with respect to the standard are supported by substantial evidence. This is clearly an appropriate and necessary judicial
consideration, and one that finds support in the Administrative Procedure Act. 176
Assuming there is substantial evidence to support the findings
with respect to the standards relied upon, the next logical question is
whether all. of the relevant factors and standards were utilized by the
Commission in reaching its decision. This problem particularly troubled Judge Celebrezze in Daniels:
[W]e are seriously perturbed about the trial judge's avowal that since
1938 or 1939, bis court has . . . sentenced ,to five years in the penitentiary every young man who has refused to obey an order of a draft
board. That statement . . . suggests a general practice . • . of imposing a sentence without particular reference to the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime or of the background of the
criminal defendant. 177
Judge Celebrezze was concerned with the consistent failure of the
trial court to utilize all of the relevant factors. At least one danger in
such a failure is that it "contradicts the judicially approved policy in
favor of 'individualizing sentences.' " 178 Because the same danger is
present, the same general principle ought to apply to sanctioning
practice. Moreover, in the context of sanctioning practice, the failure
to consider all of the relevant factors may also result in a related
deficiency. If, rather than a consistent failure to consider all of the
relevant factors in all cases, there is an inconsistent failure to consider
all of the relevant factors in some cases, there is a danger that similar
cases will not be treated similarly. In fact, as described earlier,179
this problem seems to arise in some SEC cases.
A judicial requirement that all of the relevant factors and standards be considered by the agency would minimize the problems
raised by the ''comparable case" argument-the argument that offenders in similar cases, or other offenders in the same case, have
been treated less severely.180 The current response of the Commission
176. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970). Both Professor Davis and Judge
Friendly appear to agree. See K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 982 (Supp. 1970);
Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir.
1966). See also Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86
(1973); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 599 (2d Cir. 1969).
177. United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis
added).
178. 446 F.2d at 971, quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
179. See text at notes 21-29 supra.
180. See, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967); Martin A.
Fleishman, 43 S.E.C. 185 (1966).
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and the courts to this argument has usually taken one of two forms:
that the necessary remedial action "cannot be precisely determined by
comparison with action taken in other cases"181 or that there is no
requirement that comparable cases be treated alike. 182
The first response is obviously true if it means only that sanctioning practice can never be mathematically precise. What it does not
explain, however, is why courts should not attempt to make sanctioning practice as precise as is practicable within the framework of
individualized justice. Surely, if courts require agencies to account
for all of the relevant factors in reaching a sanctioning decision, it will
be easier to isolate like cases and thus easier to treat such cases
similarly. That mathematical precision will never be reached is
hardly an argument for not doing all that can be done. Courts, of
course, often respond to a defendant's allegation that offenders in
comparable cases were treated more leniently by stating that the
difference "is irrelevant because the sanctions imposed upon the
[defendant] were well within the Commission's discretion." 188 Again
however, the fact that "[t]he Commission must have a very large
measure of discretion in determining what sanctions to impose" 18 '
should not insulate completely the Commission's decisions. The
courts should at least make sure that the Commission's discretion has
been exercised reasonably and with an even hand. 18 1, By requiring
the agencies to consider all of the relevant factors before imposing a
sanction, the courts not only would be fulfilling their obligation to
maintain the integrity of the legal process, but would also be aiding
the agencies in fulfilling their own obligations to that process.
The second response to the comparable case argument-that
there is no requirement that comparable cases be treated alikerequires two answers. First, the statement taken literally runs counter
to the concept of a system of law applicable to all equally. Judicial
approval of the policy of individualized sanctions186 is not inconsistent with the concept of equality of ~eatment. The policy of indivi181. Martin A Fleishman, 43 S.E.C. 185 (1966).
182. See, e.g., Shawmut Assn. v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945). The
Supreme Court has noted that "[m]ere unevenness in the application of the sanction
does not render its application in a particular case 'unwarranted in law.'" Butz v.
Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 188 (1973). Arguably, the Court has
left room for judicial intervention when the ''unevenness" is more than "mere." See
Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 n.8 (1975). But see 512 F.2d at
1224-25 n.15 (Russell, J., dissenting).
183. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967).
184. Tager v. SEC;344 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1965).
185. See Friendly, Judicial Control of Discretionary Action., 23 J. LEGAL •Eouc.
63, 64 (1971).
186. See United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1971).
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dualized sanctions means that the attempt to determine a proper
sanction must go beyond mere identification of the statutory offense
and must include all of the relevant information about the offense and
the offender. 187 . When the individualizing process is complete, however, there will still be groups of like cases. To be sure, the process is
not mathematically precise, but, again, like cases should be treated
alike to the extent practically possible.
Second, to say that comparable cases need not be treated alike
raises a question about the extent to which an agency ought to follow
its established policies and precedents. This, of course, is the third
component of the test that a court might use to evaluate the propriety
of the agency's utilization of sanctioning standards: has the agency
inexplicably departed from its established policy or practice? Even if
all of the relevant factors are accounted for, the agency may seek to
impose a different sanction than it has imposed in similar cases fn the
past. Clearly, agencies are intended to have flexibility in carrying out
their functions; 188 furthermore, while standards are developed by
experience, "[t]he administrator is expected to treat experience not as
a jailer but as a teacher.ms 9 Nonetheless, there is an important
difference between modifying policy to meet changing regulatory
needs, and inexplicable departures from established policy.190 If the
Commission determines that it is necessary to depart from its customary practice in sanctioning a particular type of offense, it ought to
explain the factors that necessitated the change. Without such explanation, neither the court nor the defendant can determine whether
discretion was exercised by "rules of reason"191 or by whim and
caprice.
The final judicial inquiry regarding the propriety of an agency's
1-87. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); United States v.
Daniels, 446 F.2d 967,971 (6th Cir. 1971).
188. See Shawmut Assn. v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945).
189. Shawmut Assn. v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945).
190. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719
(2d Cir. 1966); K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 981-82 (Supp. 1970).
The majority in Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 186 (1973),
stated: "We search in vain for that requirement [of uniformity] in the statute." One
does not find the requirement in the statute, however, but rather in the " 'principles
and conceptions of the "common law," and the ultimate guarantees associated with
the Constitution.'" 411 U.S. 182, 191 (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoting L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 590 (1965). It is true, as a generalization, that "a sanction • . • is thus not rendered invalid in a particular case because
it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases," 411 U.S. at 187, but the
thesis here is that a different result must follow when there is gross unexplained
disparity in sanctions in like cases. Moreover, in Butz, the majority seems implicitly
to recognize the importance of explaining prior agency sanctioning practice. See 411
U.S. at 186 n.4.
191. Friendly, supra note 185, at 64.
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utilization of sanctioning standards is whether the reasons given in
support of the sanction's imposition are internally consistent. This
was the precise nature of the challenge entertained by the Second
Circuit in Wong Wing Hang. 192 Wong, a Chinese citizen, had
entered the United States under a false claim. Subsequent to his
entry, Wong had, among other things,193 given false information to
officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) about
himself, his wife, and other Chinese immigrants. Wong did not
dispute his deportability under the provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 194 but he did apply for a (discretionary) suspension
of deportation. Wongs eligibility to apply for the Attorney General's
favorable exercise of discretion was conditioned on Wong's being "a
person of good moral character."195 Although the Special Inquiry
Officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals "found that Wong's
misconduct . . . was insufficient to condemn him as lacking 'good
moral character,' " 196 his application was denied because of his prevarications. On appeal, "Wong contend[ed] that the determination
. . . [was] internally inconsistent-he was found to have possessed
'good moral character' . . . yet was faulted for prevarication.
"197

Judge Friendly, however, held that the result was not necessarily
"a self-contradiction" since the finding of good moral character
merely made Wong eligible to apply for suspension of deportation
and did not require the discretionary grant of suspension. Furthermore, Judge Friendly found that, independent of the "mere" eligibility requirements, false statements made to the INS might be an
appropriate standard to guide the ultimate exercise of discretion to
suspend deportation. 198
Regardless of one's opinion of the result, the importance of
Wong Wing Hang is in Judge Friendly's recognition that an exercise
of discretion may be judicially reviewed to determine whether the
agency's reasons for its actions are internally consistent. This seems
appropriate, for clearly the agency should do more than demonstrate
192. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715
(1966).
193. He had also been convicted as a co-conspirator in the perpetration of
passport frauds. 360 F.2d at 716.
194. Immigration & Nationality Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. ·§ 12Sl(a)(2)
(1970).
195. Immigration & Nationality Act § 244(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)
(1970).
196. 360 F.2d at 717.
197. 360 F.2d at 719.
198. 360 F.2d at 719.
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that it has made findings and has considered all of the appropriate
standards-it must also show that its decision was rational.
Finally, it should •be noted that the proposed :framework ,to guide
judicial inquiry into alleged abuses of discretion does not purport to
solve all cases mechanically; rather, it is intended to direct the inquiry
and to require courts to do more than merely determine whether the
sanctions chosen were within the permissible statutory range. 199

C.

Equal Protection Challenges to Sanctioning Discretion

The most serious problem disclosed by the case study was the
apparent disparity between sanctions imposed on NYSE members
and those imposed on all other offenders. Because of the potential
for- a constitutional challenge based upon this disparity in SEC sanctions, the equal protection implications of SEC practice are discussed
here separately.200
In the context of the SEC's sanctioning practice, an equal protection challenge would not be directed at a discriminatory classification
contained in a formal rule, nor at the factors that the Commission has
indicated it will use in guiding its discretion; rather, the challenge
would be directed at the discriminatory patterns of SEC sanctioning
practice. These patterns of actual practice are, in effect, the "law."
This approach is not new; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 201 decided nearly one
hundred years ago, held that, "-[t]hough the law itself be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered
by public authority with . . . an unequal hand, so as to practically
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances . . . the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution."202 However, despite the apparent
199. The framework for review is not inconsistent with the rule for review,
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, that a sanction may not be overturned unless it is
" 'unwarranted in law or . • • without justification in fact • . • .• " Butz v. Glover
Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973). Review of the factual
justification finds its counterpart in the substantial evidence inquiry suggested above.
The other elements of the framework for review suggested above are elaborations on
how to determine whether the sanction has warrant in the law, an inquiry that must
go beyond a conclusion that the sanction is within the statutory range, or an
unanalyzed conclusion that differences in sanction severity do not warrant reversal.
200. In the context of an equal protection challenge to a federal agency, it is
important to note that "[w]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process.'" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973) (Brennan, J.),
quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964). Recently, Justice Brennan
stated: "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has
always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'' Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
201. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
202. 118 U.S. at 373-74.
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encouragement that Yick Wo may offer, an equal protection challenge is not without difficulties.
For one thing, although the Warren Court's two-tiered test for
equal protection inquiries has been much criticized, 208 the Court has
not abandoned the du~ standard in spite of recent opportunities to do
so. For example, in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 204 .the Court reiterated its adherence to ,the two-tiered
standard: "We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect
class or infringes upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.
. . . If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine
whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose . . . ."205 Thus, if the SEC's sanctioning practice is to be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, it must be shown that either a
suspect class or fundamental right is involved; if a suspect class or
fundamental right is not present, then the less rigorous "mere rationality" standard will be applied. The Court is not likely, however, to
expand the list of classes now recognized as suspect to include nonNYSE broker-dealers;206 nor is employment likely to be recognized as
"a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution."207

It is true that employment offered, controlled, or licensed by the
government has received increased constitutional protection in the
form of due process notice and hearing requirements. 208

Yet, the

203. See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-137 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
204. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
205. 411 U.S. at 17.
206. The categories now recognized as suspect include: race, Loving v. Virginia,
382 U.S. 1 (1967); national origin, Graham v. Richardson, 402 U.S. 365 (1971); and
alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), It appears that not even
classifications based upon gender or wealth are automatically suspect. Although
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973 ), classified sex as suspect, only four
justices specifically agreed to that basis for the decision (one of whom, Justice
Douglas, bas since resigned from the Court), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975), failed to invoke the suspect class criterion. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (sex); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (wealth).
207. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
208. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Willner v. Committee
on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957); Schlochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Hornsby v.
Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
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expanded notions of liberty209 and property210 that form the basis for
procedural due process protection do not necessarily require the
Court to designate employment a fundamental right for . equal
protection pur.poses. 211 As the Rodriguez Court said:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.
Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is
not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance
of education . • . • Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.212

Arguably, in light of the intimate tie between employment and the
ultimate enjoyment of both liberty and property,213 the Court ought
to scrutinize strictly the rational basis of any classification that infringes upon employment; indeed, liberty and property become empty
vessels for the average citizen if employment is not carefully protected
from arbitrary or unequal governmental interference or termination. 214 It is not likely, however, that the Court will find in the text
of the Constitution a basis for declaring employment to be a funda209. " 'Without doubt, [liberty] clenotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual . • • to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, • • • and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized • • . as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'" Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
·
.
210. "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person . . . [must] have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (i972). The Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265
(1970), cited with approval the following passage from Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 14 YALE LJ. 1245, 1255 (1964):
"Society today is built around entitlement. The a¥tomobile dealer has his franchise,
the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union membership,
contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options .•.."
211. In Rodriguez, for example; education was not thought to have the status of a
fundamental right in spite of its obvious importance and in spite of the fact that
education, like employment, receives due process bearing protections. See Dixon v.
State Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
212. 411 U.S. at 33-34.
213. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 212-16 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. Justice Marshall, for instance, bas advocated a "sliding scale test" for equal
protection inquiries that would require the Court "in every case • • • to determine the
extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not
mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific constitutional
guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional
interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when
the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly." San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973) (dissenting). Under such a formula, might not liberty be the "specific constitutional
guarantee" and employment the "nonconstitutional interest"? Even the majority in
Roth recognized liberty as encompassing "the right of the individual • . • to engage in
any of the common occupations of life ••••" Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564,572 (1972).
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mental right. Thus, under the terms of the two-tiered test that
governs equal protection analysis, the propriety of the de facto classification of SEC broker-dealers would be evaluated by the less demanding "mere rationality" standard.
Although it has been said that when applying the mere rationality
standard a classification will be upheld if its use is justifiable under
any conceivable set of facts, 215 the test so stated is misleading. First,
it detracts from the proper focus of the test, which is that a classification must bear a rational relationship to a permissible state objective, 216 or, as the Court has recently held, a "legitimate, articulated
state purpose."217 Second, although adhering to the mere rationality
rubric, recent Supreme Court decisions have struck down classifications after engaging in an evaluative process substantially more rigorous than a search for "any conceivable" set of facts that would justify
the use of the classification. 218 This arguably more demanding
search for a rational basis is particularly important where, as here,
fundamental societal interests are at stake.
Is there a rational relationship between the classification of NYSE
broker-dealers and some articulated purpose of the securities acts that
would justify imposing less severe sanctions on NYSE members as
compared with all others? It might be argued, for example, that
Congress may have recognized that 'NYSE members are, on the
whole, better operated and less likely to violate the law than nonNYSB broker-dealers. Assuming, arguendo, the validity of that
proposition, "it tends to miss the point. The imposition of a sanction
depends on a finding that a person has in fact violated the securities
acts, regardless of how one might choose to characterize the membership groups to which the offender belongs. Thus, even if most NYSE
members have higher standards of conduct than nonmembers, that
does not dispose of the problem of sanctioning those NYSE members
who do violate the law. Although the fact that NYSE members are
215. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
216. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
217. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)
(emphasis added).
218. Recent decisions applying an apparently more rigorous scrutiny seem to
involve classes that are at least arguably suspect, see, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) (sex); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)
(illegitimacy), but the Court appears to have gone beyond the traditional rationality
scrutiny even when no "quasi-suspect" class is involved, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (marital status). To be sure, the Court has not always accepted the
invitation to apply stricter scrutiny. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
("benign" sex-based classifications); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (sex
distinctions in Navy promotions).
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better regulated than other broker-dealers219 may be a valid consideration in allocating limited SEC enforcement resources (and thus the
Commission may decide to leave most regulation of NYSE members
to the Exchange, or it may find it necessary to proceed against NYSE
members less frequently), it does not provide a basis for less severe
sanctions when the SEC finds that a NYSE member has violated the
law. In addition, it should be remembered that when the Commission does institute administrative proceedings against Exchange members, the violations alleged are--like those of other respondentsusually egregious fraud. 220
·
The fact that the NYSE may impose sanctions upon its members221 in addition to any sanctions imposed by the SEC (either
before or after the SEC acts) also fails to provide a reasonable basis
to support less severe sanctions for NYSE respondents. For one
thing, the case study found that in nearly ninety-six per cent of the
SEC cases (ninety-five of ninety-nine) involving NYSE respondents,
there had been no prior NYSE action. In the four cases in which
proceedings by the NYSE preceded action by the Commission, the
sanctions imposed by the SEC and the NYSE were comparable. 222
Furthermore, even if the NYSE should decide to institute proceedings
subsequent to an SEC proceeding, the NYSE Constitution states that
the NYSE's sanction may not be greater than that imposed by the
Commission, and, in the case of suspension, the suspension imposed
by the NYSE shall not "commence before or expire after the suspension imposed by [the SEC]." 223 Consequently, the fact that the
NYSE may impose its own sanctions does not appear to provide a
rational basis for the SEC's current sanctioning practice. 224
219. There are, however, those who do not believe NYSE firms are well regulated.
See, e.g., H. BARUCH, WALL STREr:r: SECURITY RlsK (1971).
220. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 516 (Table MM).
221. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(b)(6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(b)(6)
(Supp. Aug. 1975).
222. Although the Commission has the authority to suspend or expel a member
from the NYSE, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. §
78s(h) (2) (Supp. Aug. 1975), the Commission took such action in only two cases
examined in the case study.
223. New York Stock Exchange Constitution, art. XIV, § 16 (1973). If the
Exchange does not fulfill its statutory duty to discipline its members, whether before
or after SEC action, the Commission has the statutory power to discipline the
Exchange itself (by suspending or withdrawing its registration). Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 19(h)(1), .15~U.S.C.A. § 78s(hl(l) (Supp. Aug. 1975). The
Commission has never used this power against the NYSE. The 1975 amendments to
the Exchange Act added a provision permitting the Commission "to censure or
impose limitations upon the activities, functions, and operations or• an exchange.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(h)(1) (Supp. Aug.
1975). This may prove to be a more flexible, and therefore more realistic, sanction.
224. It is true, of course, that in a particular case in which the Exchange has
already taken disciplinary action against a member, the Commission might decide that
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Another possible explanation for the Commission's practice of de
facto classification may be the importance of the Exchange to the
securities market and to the economy generally. The Exchange is, of
course, the most important center for trading in securities. In 1972,
for instance, the NYSE's trading volume was $168.9 billion-about
78 per cent of all exchange trading. 225 Thus, it might be argued that
to expel (or even to suspend for long periods) member firms would
interfere with this important economic institution. However, it appears equally plausible to suggest that, because of the enormous
importance of the NYSE, its members ought to be vigorously regulated and disciplined when violations are found to have occurred. 220
If the purposes of the securities acts are to protect investors and to inspire confidence in fair markets for securities, then the most important members of the industry should not be the least likely to be
sanctioned for misconduct.
A related argument in favor of treating NYSE members less
severely is that NYSE members are more likely to affect the accounts
of a large number of investors, in which case revocation could have a
disruptive effect upon millions of customers. Again, however, the
better approach would seem to be vigorous enforcement of the securities laws in the case of NYSE members precisely because the protection of so many investors is at stake. To be sure, one ought not to
take lightly a decision to revoke the registration of a firm with branch
offices throughout the country; indeed, the violation may have been
limited to one branch or department. A decision to revoke the
registration of a firm, however, is not the Commission's only alternative. If some, but not all, of the firm's personnel were involved, the
individuals responsible for the violation may be the only ones expelled-a solution that achieves the purpose of the securities acts
without necessarily affecting the registration of the firm. In fact,
however, few individuals associated with NYSE firms are barred for
offenses that result in bar when committed by their non-NYSE counterparts. 221
its own disciplinary proceeding is unnecessary. That determination, however, should
go to the question whether to proceed, not what sanction to impose after deciding to
proceed.
225. 39 SEC .ANNuAL REPORT 154 (1973).
226. See Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 916 (1960) ("[l]n large organizations it
is especially imperative that the system of internal control be adequate and effective
and that those in authority exercise the utmost vigilance whenever even a remote
indicatic;>n of irregularity reaches their attention").
227. Limited expulsion has been imposed in both fraud and nonfraud cases. Also,
rather than -suspend the operations of an entire firm office, the SEC has imposed
sanctions on single departments or branch offices. These limited sanctions were
adopted in twenty-seven NYSE cases, but only seven non-NYSE cases. The high
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The upshot of this inquiry is that it is at least arguable that the
Commission's de facto classification of NYSE broker-dealers fails to
bear a rational relationship to any of the legitimate articulated purposes of the securities acts; therefore, even under the mere rationality
test, this aspect of the Commission's practice would seem to violate
the equal protection clause.
The theoretical difficulties of making an equal protection based
challenge to the Commission's practice are, however, probably not the
most substantial roadblocks; the real problem is the present judicial
attitude toward review of sanctions (or sentences). For example, in
McGautha v. California, 228 the Supreme Court refused to uphold a
constitutional challenge to standardless jury sentencing in spite of the
"undeniable surface appeal of the proposition." 229 Writing for the
majority, Justice Harlan stated:
To identify before the fact those characteristics . . . which call for
the death penalty, and to express [them] in language which can be
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to
be tasks which are beyond present human ability . . . .
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing
to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life
or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. 2so
Formulating reasonable standards to guide the exercise of sanctioning discretion is not an easy task, but it certainly is not a task
beyond present human ability. AB Justice Brennan suggested in his
dissent in McGautha, the matter is capable of solution; the failure to
make an attempt to find "imaginative procedures" designed ",to as~
sure evenhanded treatment" 231 is to tolerate "Government by whim
. . . , the very antithesis of due process."232 Thus, as Justice Brennan pointed out, by refusing to provide a meaningful form of judicial
review over the sanctioning process, the Court in Mc,Gautha sustained
"against a due process challenge such an unguided, unbridled, unreviewable exercise of naked power" as never before. 233
frequency for NYSE firms is explained in part by the fact that NYSE firms are more
likely to have branch offices. They would not, however, necessarily be more likely to
have departments.
228. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
229. 402 U.S. at 196.
230. 402 U.S. at 204, 207.
231. 402 U.S. at 249.
232. 402 U.S. at 250.
233. 402 U.S. at 252.
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CONCLUSION

Devices for providing meaningful control over administrative
sanctioning discretion are presently available, and administrative or
legislative promulgation of sanctioning standards is both necessary
and feasible. With or without standards embodied in formal regulations, however, the courts should recognize the necessity of exercising
their authority to subject sanctioning practice to review.
In light of the existing framework to guide review of the exercise
of administrative discretion, the reluctance of the courts to subject
sanctioning discretion to meaningful review is curious. 284 The necessity for review seems obvious, and the basis for judicial review of
other agency action (and the exercise of discretion in general) is an
accepted part of administrative law. Those same principles of judicial review can be applied to the sanctioning process without sacrificing flexibility. In short, although discretion is necessary in the
sanctioning process, such discretion must be exercised reasonably and
lawfully, not arbitrarily. Thus, an agency's decision to choose an
appropriate sanction ought to be guided by proper standards and
supported by adequate findings and reasons.
It is sometimes suggested that requiring agencies to supply reasons for their discretionary decisions and subjecting those decisions to
review would impose unnecessary costs upon the agency. When
essential questions are raised that challenge the inherent fairness of
our system of adjudication, however, arguments and equations about
costs and benefits must themselves be weighted against the costs to a
just legal system. In the case of the SEC, a requirement of standards
~d reasons would not place a substantial new burden upon the
agency; the agency not only already has rule-making authority and
rule-making mechanisms, but already formulates specific reasoned
opinions that purport to justify its sanctions in light of the statutorily
imposed public interest standard. If judicial scrutiny of the agency's
standards and reasons imposes a cost upon the agency, that expense is
balanced by the potential cost to offenders who may have been
sanctioned arbitrarily.
234. See Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 189-91 (1973)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart criticized the majority for ignoring
"the valid principle of law • . .-the principle that like cases are to be treated alike,"
411 U.S. at 190, and noted further that the Court's refusal, in effect, to permit
meaningful review of sanctions represented "an odd result at a time when serious
concern is being expressed about the fairness of agency justice," 411 U.S. at 191,

